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INFORMATION CAPITAL
An Introduction from an Anecdotal Perspective
~--~:_:;:. . ....- .
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INTRODUCTION
The Hardware
It is common knowledge to the Wall Street buff that computer
manufacturing and data processing are the fastest growing economic
activities in the private sector. From 1958 to 1968 the rate of
growth in sales of the computing and office equipment industry far
exceeded that of any other industrial activity.1 From 1955 to 1963
the number of computers in use grew from 500 to 16,0002 (10% operated
by the Federal Government), while from 1960 to 1969 the sales of IBM
grew from two to almost eight billion dollars.3
As of October 1969, the telecommunications industry was selling
its services at a twenty billion annual rate, and were growing at 20%
per year. 4 This growth in both hardware and software led to a growth
rate in business data transmission of about 25% a year such that by
1980 it is estimated that 10% of all the economy's network capacity
(including telephone and cable T.V.) will be shuffling data alone.5
In 1968 the sales of information services tied to data processing
stood at two billion and was growing at a 25% rate.6 It is estimated
1
"Who has Ridden the Growth Curve?", Business Week, Jan. 4, 1969, p. 20.
2The Diebold Group, Automation, Impact and Implications, Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, April, 1965.
3"Two Gee Shiz Giants Go at Each Other", Business Week, June 13, 1970,
70.
4
"Growing Wildly Without Blueprint", Business Week, Dec. 6, 1969, 192.
"•Op. cit., 192.
6
"ANewIndustry's Wild Ride", Business Week, May 24, 1969, 64.
that a $260 billion ten-year investment is required to develop the
information systems required for the 1980's.7
From one perspective these facts may be indicative only of
another "growth industry", simply another sign of technological
change in the economy. But from another and more fruitful per-
spective, we can view them as part of the fast development "infor-
mation infrastructure" for the burgeoning "communications revolution".
Just as the industrial revolution was proceeded by infrastructure
investment in canals, railroads, and new energy sources, so does the
communications revolution rest on the development of"society's channel",
on its ability to process and model increasing flows of information
through its information networks. In this context the growth in com-
puter sales and data processing services can be analyzed in tandem
with the developments in the communications, media, and electronic
processing services.
Perhaps most symbolic of these developments has been the growth
in cable T.V. There are now 2,400 cable systems in the U.S. serving
12 million viewers or about 6o of the television audience.8 Industry
representatives estimate that by 1980 cable will serve close to 100
million viewers generating an annual revenue of three billion and
employing 750,000 men and women.9 The power and significance of
cable lies, of course, in its channel capacity. Present rates of
7
"Growing Wildly Without Blueprint", Business Week, Dec. 6, 1969, 192.
8Ralph Lee Smith, "The Wired Nation", The Nation, May 18, 1970, 583.
9Radical Software, no. 2. p. 2.
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credit), real-estate men can get instant readings on available pro-
perties across the country, cattle farmers can get instance price
and production data several times a day through a computer based
information service, and state and local governments have developed
prototype urban information systems. The development of a domestic
satellite system along the lines of Intelstat (the present global
system) will permit an even greater integration of national and
international information networks. Banks may turn out to be the
central institution in the gradual integration of corporate information
systems as their own systems of credit card payment, counseling
services, payroll compilations (for corporate depositors), economic
research and trust fund supervision become increasingly interwoven.
The information technologies have also had a decisive impact
on the technological structure of the industrial sector of the
economy. The simplest indicator of this impact is the steady shift
to white collar employment in manufacturing enterprises. Thus, from
1947 to 1969 the proportion of white collar in the manufacturing
labor force rose from 16.4% to 26.8% or 60o.12 In effect, the pro-
portion engaged in information "production" rises while the proportion
engaged in commodity production falls. This reflects not only an
increase in information processing activities but also the impact
of cybernetic (i.e., information-feedback-control) modes of physical
production. In fact, from 1955-1969 nine basic manufacturing industries
1L•The Manpower Report of the President, 1970, Table C-5.
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experienced absolute declines in blue collar employment though size-
able increases in output. 1 3
The following table (a daring attempt at quanitification by Rich-
ard Meier) 1 4  captures the notion of a developing information infra-
structure. (The vertical vectors superimposed on the graph represent
rates of growth.) As can be seen the greatest number and fastest
growing of "transactions per interval" lies in the region of tele-
communications. As the graph indicates, the growth in telecommunications
promise a decrease in the average cost of a socio-economic transaction.
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These data require a large number of rules and conventions regarding the proper
allocation of energy costs before a distribution like the above can be plotted. How-
ever the substitution of telecommunications transactions for energy-intensive transactions
at the growing margin does become apparent, and it is evident that henceforth social
and economic activity should expand at a more rapid rate than energy consumption.
SJulius Rezler, Automation and Industrial Labor, Random House,
New York, 1969, p. 35.
1 4Richard L. Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban Growth, M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, 1962, p. 61.
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The Software
There can be little doubt that the hardware of the communications
revolution, the "electronic highway", is fast developing. But as
the amount of information available for decision making increases
there develops a great incentive to use such information efficiently
and effectively. An "information explosion" can be counterproductive
unless accompanied by an increasing ability to structure and pattern
information. Decision making can no longer be left to informal pro-
cesses, to the "intutition" of governmental. corporate, and insti-
tutional managers. Rather it must be systematized and integrated
with information flows. Software, a decision making technology in
the form of programs, models, knowledge, and education becomes the
central and organizing factor in an organization's and society's
"information capital". In effect, the increasing flow of information
restructures the decision making process. Decision making is trans-
formed into a technology. It becomes a consciously designed human
activity amplified by man-made instruments. Problem solving, once
the domain of intuition and the skill that comes with years becomes
part of a rationalized man-machine system. Problem solving and de-
cision making skills are no longer allowed to evolve as the result
of numerous and unintended trial and error experiments, but rather
are consciously designed, machine amplified, and modified as a result
of consciously articulated organizational needs.
A crude indication of a soceity's software is its educational
level. Thus from 1950 to 1964 the proportion of college age youth
in college rose from,25.5 to 43.3 percent. Within the same period
the number of Ph.D. degrees conferred increased by more than 10 0C6.15
By 1970 the proportion of such youth in college far exceeded the cor-
responding proportion for the Western European countries.1 6 Thus,
there is clear if crude evidence that society's requisite software,
the human component of man-machine decision systems, has developed
apace of the communications hardware.
But our data suggest an even more tantalizing hypothesis. As
the proportion of labor power engaged in information transmission
and decision making increases, and as decision making itself becomes
a technology, decision making replaces production as the "central"
socio-economic activity. Decision making and information processing,
rather than physical production, set the tone and define the modal-
ities of the work experience. Decision making rather than physical
production becomes the area for the application of human intelligence.
Most important, decision making becomes the new arena of political
conflict. The distribution of information rather than the distri-
bution of commodities becomes the "leading" socio-economic conflict.
Access to decision making prerogatives rather than access to physical
capital become the leading and critical demand.
15Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology", in E.
B. Sheldon, W.E. Moore, Indicators of Social Change, Russell
Sage Foundation, New York, 1968, pp. 204-206.
16Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the
Technetronic Era, Viking Press, New York, 1970, p. 27.
_I__i
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In effect, the increases in communications software and hard-
ware, in the information infrastructure and information capital,
mean that society's channel capacity, its ability to structure and
pattern information at a given rate increases. Like physical capital
that amplifies labor power's physical capabilities, information
capital amplifies labor power's information processing and decision
making capabilities. Decision making is thus transformed into a
technology, a consciously organized and machine amplified activity,
and political conflict centers around the distribution of information
and decision making prerogatives.
II
A Note for Guidance
Each chapter in this thesis explores the concept of information
capital from a different perspective. We try to show how information
capital emerges out of natural market processes, and in the process
we build toward an analytic or framework for discussing the conse-
quences of the "information revolution". Note that our interest here
is not in expanding the literature of information systems per se, i.e.,
on the efficient design of problems solving, planning and information
networks. Like the microeconomist who assumes that the firm applies
its engineering knowledge efficiently, and then explores the more
macro-consequences of this assumption, we assume "optimality" and
then explore the more macro features of organizational and social
structure.
The reader is advised to consult the appendix for the most minimal
introduction to "Information Theory". Only the most minimal is re-
quired to read the mathematical formulations of Chapter Two and Three.
C
INFORMATION CAPITAL
from the Perspective of Market Equilibrium
C- iii
Chapter One
THE MARKET AS AN INFORMATION SYSTEM
§1. It is by now a truism to note that the critical function
of markets is to coordinate massive numbers of decentralized and in-
dependently arrived at decisions. Coordination is achieved through
the combination of a price system and the profit motive that serves
as a homeostatic device to insure over-all patterns of equilibrium and
efficiency. But if we are to have a deeper understanding of the market
as an information system, we have to ask: a) What kinds of information
are required for market decisions? b) How does the cost of information
affect patterns of coordination? c) What impact does better or "more
perfect" information have on market coordination?
General equilibrium models probably constitute the most explicit
statement of the price system as the market's "data base". Such
models usually assume that each decision maker knows, and need only know
the present and future price of every input and output. An auctioneer
then takes all bids and offers, and through some recontracting device
arrives at a set of present and future equilibrium prices. It is readily con-
ceded that such models are massive abstractions but nevertheless demonstrate
the "possibility" of equilibrium. But it is difficult to determine the
relevance of such "equilibriums" if critical assumptions about infor-
mation in the model cannot be justified.
a
Since all prices are known to all decision makers, it is im-
plicitly assumed that information is costless. Price information
is presumably printed in a kind of"stock market" page and distri-
buted freely by the auctioneer. It is also assumed that future
prices are in fact obtainable (an assumption made more tenuous if
we let the commodity structure change over time), and that the firm
is interested only in prices.
Information is of course not costless. Stiglerl shows that where
search is costly, there will be a distribution of prices for some
given homogeneous commodity. In the interest of economizing on search
costs producers and consumers can persist in inefficient patterns of
production and sale, by relying on modes of goodwill and reputation.
More importantly, the firm cannot afford to know "everything", every
price. Comprehensive knowledge comes at a price, and as a consequence
the decision unit must restrict its range of consideration.
Prices do not exhaust the category of information necessary for
decision making. Inquiries into consumer tastes, technological and
scientific development, political decisions, legal restrictions, and
a whole host of data we associate with the "sensing" of opportunity are
essentially non price data. Markets do not "provide" this data in any
meaningful sense.2
'George Stigler, "The Economics of Information," J. Political Economy,
June 1961, pp. 213-225.
2Urban agglomerations are usually credited with providing suchl data
at low prices, particularly when the decision maker is inot lookillng
for a specific piece of data, but simply wants to stay "informed".
See William Alonso, "Industrial Location and Economic Development",,
working paper no. 13, Center for Planning and Development Research,
University of California at Berkeley.
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Finally, future prices are not known, particularly if patterns
of consumption change over time. No "arbitrage" can exist between
presently known products and future unknown products. Future markets
will be functional only where the commodity is homogeneous and storage
costs are low. (Money markets are the best example.) To be sure,
capital markets represent generalized trades between the present and
future, but no claim can be made that the structure of interest rates
represents "real" trade-offs. An interest rate simply reflects both
a lender's and borrower's guess about the future. Because such guesses
are shot through with uncertainty, the "established"investor with a
past record of success can purchase funds at a lower price.
General equilibrium model builders will readily admit to these
objections, but will insist that their "equilibrium conditions" are
of heuristic value. Perhaps. But the most curious consequence of
these models is the modification if not the subversion of the original
"invisible hand" concept. What puzzled Smith in 1776 and Hayek in 1937 -
was the fact that markets could coordinate independently arrived at
decisions despite the fact that no one had the "full picture", the
comprehensive view" of market patterns. Invisible hand meant just that,
coordination took place "behind the backs" of the actors. Contrary
to the general equilibrium assumptions no one knew all the prices.
How then can fragmented views result in coherent and comprehensive
patterns?
.Friedrich Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge," Economica, F'ebrtlary 1937.
__ _
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There is no mystery in the question or answer, but G.B. Richardson4
provides a precise framework for considering the problem. Thus imagine
that we listed the marginal revenue product and wage rate of factor
J in all its N uses in "chain" fashion as below. (Profit maximization
in each use insures W. = MRP.)
1 1
(W1 = MRP1) -4 (W2 = MRP2 ) -4 (W3 = MRP3) -> ''' -. (Wn = MRP )n n
If each individual actor were "informed" about the wage rate in
his use and his use only, then there is no presumption that these arrows
will become equal signs. But as soon as there is a minimal "overlap"
of information, so that W. is known by two and only two actors, and
1
each actor knows only two wage rates, (n- 1) actors will insure full
and "optimal" equilibrium (i.e., the MRP of factor J is the same in
all its uses). Thus with minmal overlap, the "division of knowledge"
can lead to comprehensive and coherent patterns. Smith and company
were right to marvel at the market as an instrument for coordination.
Where information processing capabilities were limited, and information
search was costly, fragmented information could "add up" to coherent
over -all patterns.
This adding up process -- the "arrival" at equilibrium states is
of course always tendential. Where the overlaps in knowledge are small,
i.e., the information processing capabilities of the individual units
are limited, and the transmission of the information down the chain is
4Gerald B. Richardson: "Imperfect Knowledge and Economic Efficiency,"
Oxford Economic Papers, June 1953, pp. 136-156; "Equilibrium, Ixpec-
tations, and Informaltion," Economic Journal, June 1959, pp. 223-237.
a
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slow, long periods of disequilibrium can persist. "In the long run"
initial conditions can themselves change, so that the "tendency"
toward equilibrium remains just that, only a tendency.
There is however, no one single equilibrium position. Equi-
librium is always a "subjective" state. It exists when all plans
are fullfilled and there is no incentive to change behavior. Thus
imagine that a "subset" from the middle of the chain was broken off
at both ends so that information flows only within the three emerging
subsets but not between them. Then the system will be in equilibrium
when each subset is in equilibrium, even if this implied different
MRP's in different uses for the same factor. So long as there are
no information flows to inform the actors of these differences, there
will be no tendency toward a new more "efficient" position. This is
simply the extreme case of "immobilities". In general, the greater
the degree of segmentation, the greater the likelihood that the over-
all system will reach an equilibrium state.
We can show this more rigorously, and simultaneously deepen our
understanding of the relationship between complexity, information pro-
cessing capabilities, and equilibrium, by using a matrix rather than a
chain to visualize all forms (price and non-price) of information.
Thus let us perform the following "thought" experiment. Let an
(N X N) matrix list the names of all decision makers down the rows
and across the columns. Give each decision maker "his" row vector and
let him check a column, if and only if, during some specified period
0
_ ~_·
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of economic activity he is "informed" of the general state and be-
havior of the decision maker represented by the column. (Presumably,
information about the state and behavior of another decision maker
can include price information and/or considerations of oligopolistic
interactions.) The resulting pattern of checks throughout the matrix
represents the flow of information between the decision makers. No
information flows whatsoever, would result in checks along the main
diagnol only, while total information flow would be shown by a com-
pletely "filled" in matrix. More realistically, we would expect a
pattern of "submatrices" to emerge, block diagnol in form, represent-
ing independent subsystems within the economy. This segmentation is
then the analogue of our broken chain.
What can we say about the tendency toward equilibrium in such a
system? To repeat, equilibrium is a subjective state. So long as
plans are fulfilled and no new information intrudes, a system is in
equilibrium regardless of "real" marginal equilivancies. More im-
portantly, price need not be the only or even major form of'information"
signal. Price is both a resource cost and a factor income. Because
a price is someone's income there are always institutional pressures
to stabilize prices and use other kinds of information signals as homeo-
static devices. (To function as a homeostat, a variable must change. 5)
5Romney Robinson develops a model of "disequilibrium price", in which the
price is set at the revenue maximizing point for the industry, but above
individual firms' marginal cost. "Share of the Market" then functions
as the industry's homeostatic device. Since industry price is greater
than firm marginal cost, each firm has an incentive to expand production.
Competitive equilibrium ensues when as a result of these efforts market
shares stabilize. A falling market share is the "signal" for the firm to
change its behavior. (Note that Robinson's model allows for meaningful
competitive equilibrium whereas the general equilibrium models do not. In
the latter the firm expands production to the point where price equals
marginal cost. At that point it has no incentive to increase production
by "stealing" its competitors' customers. The neo-classical equilibrium
is strictly non-competitive.)
0
Now consider an independent subsystem of our matrix. Presumably,
it will arrive at its own internal equilibrium by some process of
"iteration" (analogous to a linear programming solution). We can
think of two extreme forms of this "iterative" process, one result-
ing in the shortest time to reach equilibrium, and the other in the
longest.6 Let N be the number of decision making units, let T be
the time unit under consideration (e.g. days), and let P be the pro-
bility that any unit will "hit" upon its correct equilibrium position.
("Correct" in that it will be consistent with over-all subsystem equi-
librium. Assume that there is only one set of equilibrium values.)
Then we postulate that equilibrium will be reached most quickly when
each unit in succession arrives at its correct position. Since it
will take each unit about T/P to arrive at equilibrium, total sub-
system time will be TN/P. At the other extreme, we postulate that
the system will reach equilibrium only when all the units simultaneously
arrive at their correct position. (This is clearly the most extreme
since there is no such thing as being "almost" there; (N- 1) units
may be at the right point, but if the N'th unit is a laggard it's still
"no go".) In this case it will take on the average T/PN for the sub-
system to arrive at equilibrium. Thus we can say that the actual
equilibrium Et will be given such that
TN/P < Et < T/pN
6The following discussion is an adaptation and extension from, W. Ross
Ashby, Design for a Brain, Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London, 1960, p.
151.
I
Let us assume now that
Et = (TN/P+ T/PN)
Then if we have J independent subsystems the entire system will reach
equilibrium in an amount of time given by
max(E) , i = 1...,J
because by assumption the subsystems proceed to equilibrium independently
of each other. Now it is clear that
dE /dNi > 0
Thus for a fixed number of decision makers, as the number of independent
subsystems fall max(Et) will rise, or at least not fall. If we let
S be the number of independent subsystems, we have in summary,
d max(Et)/dSj < O
Intuitively, as the degree of "complexity" in the entire system in-
creases (i.e., as "interdependence" increases with the fall in the
number of independent subsystems), the time required to reach equi-
librium also increases. The system is characterized by longer and
longer periods of "disequilibrium" as its degree of complexity increases.
This assumes, however, that dP/dS = 0. If we let dP/dSj < 0 then the
sign of d max(Et)/dSj is ambiguous. What are the determinants of P?
P is the probability that the decision unit will be able to hit
upon its correct equilibrium position. This will be a function of
its information processing capabilities, i.e., its ability to observe
0
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and process information concerning other decision making units, and
its "modelling" capabilities, i.e., its ability to "structure" its
information so as to anticipate possible equilibrium positions. Now
a decrease in SJ implies an improvement in the former capability,
since subsystems can be joined only when information flows across
subsystem "borders". (i.e., subsystem A will join subsystem B, only
when A can absorb information about the actions of units in B). But
a decrease in SJ need not imply an increase in the latter capability.
A unit can observe and process new information without being able to
model it. 7
Thus the system can handle its own complexity if the ability
of the firm to structure its increased information flows improves
along with the increases in system complexity. We say that this
ability is a function of the amount of the firm's "information capital".
Thus "information capital" emerges as the sine qua non for equilibrium
patterns as system complexity increases. In other words, an increase
in system complexity requires an increase in information capital if
markets are to continue to perform their equilibrating and coordinat-
ing function.
7To give an analogy, if we let C be the former capability and M the
latter, then the international arms race is high on C but low on M,
i.e., the system tends toward increasing disequilibrium as the number
of arms increases but the amount of defense falls. For a more detailed
discussion see, Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense, Harper and
Bros., New York. 1962, p. 151. We can say more quixotically that im-
provements in C unaccompanied by improvements in M, mean that the in-
creasing flows of information are simply disorienting. The decision
unit can observe his inter dependence with other units but is unable
to act upon this information, to adapt to the newly perceived inter-
depenidence , a process analogous to Tofflcr's description illn :utiitre
Shock. See, Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, Random Ilouse, New York, 1970.
Within this framework the "entrepreneur" emerges as the "knowledge
gap filler". Equilibrium of the entire system is based on a kind of
pact of "mutual ignorance". Subsystems "agree" to ignore each other,
and in this way limit the variability of their environments (solving
the problem of their limited information processing capabilities).
But the entrepreneur upsets the applecart. He has the more "compre-
hensive vision" and takes advantage of "differences" he perceives over
the entire system. Subsystems are thus joined, but in the process old
patterns of information flow and decision making are destroyed. The
destructive process is critical. Members of the old subsystem face
new environments. Old patterns of decision making will no longer be
appropriate, and unless the firm can adapt to its new "field" it could
very well go under.9 This destructive process is itself an incentive
for the firm to "build up" its information capital stock. To adapt
to larger subsystems and to insure its future adaptability, it will
want to increase its information processing and modelling capabilities.
Note that as in Knight our entrepreneur is rewarded for strict
uncertainty, since he responds to information differences outside the
normal patterns of information flow.
To briefly summarize, information processing and modelling capa-
bilities determine both the complexity and equilibrium tendencies of
8This is a concept developed by Leibenstein. See Harvey Leibenstein,
"Entrepreneurship and Development," American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings, May 1968, p. 75.
9This is analogous to Schumpeter's process of "creative destruction".
See, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,
Harper and Row, New York, 1962, chapter 8.
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market systems. We say that the general equilibrium model evades
some of the critical problems associated with the nature of these
capabilities by assuming information to be costless. All the relevant
data was available to everyone. The Richardson framework solves
these problems by showing how fragmented information -- the division
of knowledge -- could result in over-all coherence. Nevertheless,
such coherence is only a theoretical tendency, and equilibrium was
more likely to result as a consequence of market segmentation.
We then showed how increasing complexity, cetirus paribus, led to
longer periods of increasing disequilibrium, instability, unless
accompanied by concomitants increases in information capital. We
noted that information capital was likely to emerge if firms sought
to insure their future adaptation. Thus we can argue that information
d
capital is both a result ofas a necessary condition for market
complexity.
complexity.
§2. One of the more accepted dictums of economic theory is
that perfect information leads to perfect markets. This dictum is
no doubt responsible for the scant attention paid by economists to
the recent and rapid changes in communications and information tech-
nologies. The growth in society's "data base" is seen simply as an
extension of a process begun with the industrial revolution -- the
growth and perfection of markets as social mechanisms for coordination,
and arbiters of social change. But before this proposition can be
accepted one has to rigorously define "perfect information".
There are in general three dimensions to the "information set" of
a decision making unit. There is the range of variables, the precision
with which they can be measured, and the perceived degree of correlation
between them. An "improvement" along any one of these dimensions is
a movement toward better or increasingly perfect information.
The economist's dictum is perhaps clearest if we consider only
the dimension of precision. Thus imagine a stable equilibrium of
independent subsystems described in the last section. As the homeo-
static variables are known with greater precision, the iterative pro-
cess improves, periods of disequilibrium are shortened, and subsystem
markets become "more perfect". But as we saw improvements along the
other two dimensions, were a consequence of developing system complex-
ity and emerging information capital.
It is the central contention of this thesis that the emergence
of information capital has social and economic consequences that far
9
transcend the increasing perfection of markets. In the coming chapters
we will argue that information capital, as the locus of society's
new decision making technology, destroys old decision making patterns,
old organization structures, and unleashes new conflicts surrounding
decision making prerogatives. The "distribution of information"
becomes a dimension of social conflict. We will argue that ultimately
the growth in information capital modifies the role of markets as mecha-
nisms for social coordination, as consciously designed information
systems increasingly guide social and economic behavior.
Mi
INFORMATION CAPITAL
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Chapter Two
CHANNEL CAPACITY, ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH
AND THE EMERGENCE OF INFORMATION CAPITAL
Introduction
Economic theorists have long wondered why there should be
long run diminishing returns to firm output.' A rising average cost
curve is explicable as a short run phenomena. Some factor, most
likely the capital stock, will be "fixed". But fixed factors would
seem a logical impossibility in the "long run". In the "long run"
as output grows everywhere, there are no resource constraints on any
given input, so that constant returns to scale should prevail at the
point of minimum average cost. What then is the long run "scarce"
factor? The answer is most often the entrepreneurial or managerical
input itself. Coordination costs are subject to the law of diminish-
ing returns. Managing too large and complex an enterprise imposes
costs above and beyond the cost of production. The answer is plau-
sible enough but is never rigorously justified. What are the deter-
minants of managerial "coordination capacity"? If they are technological
in origin can't their implicit costs be reduced through "technological
progress"? What would be the substance of this "progress"?
The central theme of this chapter is that "coordination" capacity
is a function of information processing capabilities, and that long
For an extended discussion of this problem, see Kenneth Arrow, "The
Firm in General Equilibrium", Technical Report #3, May 1969, Harvard
University (unpublished). Also see, Chandler H. Stevens, Information
and the Division of Labor, Doctoral Dissertation, M.I.T., Jan., 1967,
chapter 4.
0
term improvement in such capabilities gives rise to what we have
loosely called "information capital". We will show that information
capital emerges out of the limits imposed by the two major forms of
organizational growth, growth through scale and growth through the
structural differentiation. However, as we shall touch on lightly
here, and in more depth in Chapter Five, the emergence of information
capital is a destructive process, that sets the stage for further
conflicts over decision making power.
0
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§1. The Organization as an Information System
Any organization can be viewed as a sum of its component parts,
each part performing a distinct and unique function. The functional
coherence of any given part makes it a relatively independent sub-
system within the organization. As a consequence, communication
within the parts, the subsystems, is greater than communication
between them.
These relationships can be shown with the matrix used in our
"thought experiment" of Chapter One.2 Thus, if we let A and B be
the units of subsystem I, and C and D be the units of subsystem II,
and if we let the entries in the matrix be the indices of communication
between units we would have
A B C D
A 60 2 2
B 60 2 2
C 2 2 ' 60
D 2 2 60
Figure 1
This matrix of communication is "nearly decomposable". If we
let the communication indices between the subsystems go to zero, our
matrix would become block diagnol in form composed of two completely
independent subsystems.
2For a more complete exposition of this approach see, Herbert Simon,
The Science of the Artificial, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, p. [02.
a
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However, the smaller the degree of communication between the
subsystems, the more difficult will be the task of organizational
coordination. The organization must in the end function as a coherent
whole. If communication between the subsystems is minimized, the
organization could degenerate into its component parts each pursuing
its own goals. Subsystem actions would become inconsistent with
each other and the organizational "rate of error" would increase.
Thus, if a production unit did not communicate with the sales force
too few or too many goods would be produced.
To counter a rising rate of error as subsystem communication
falls, the subsystems must "buffer" themselves by various forms of
resource "stockpiling". Thus, as in our previous example, the pro-
duction unit will seek some optimum level of inventories to protect
itself against variability in sales orders. In general, "buffering"
will result in some form of "excess capacity". A production and
design unit of an electronics firm may each have two draftsmen,
though at any given moment none are used to "full capacity". Greater
communication between the units could cut the number of draftsmen
required in half, but because of low "information exchange" each unit
retains two for unexpected periods of "peak activity".
Now buffer costs could be reduced if subsystem communication
were increased, but communication also costs. Thus any organization
confronts a "trade-off" between buffer and communication costs, the
former increasing as subsystem communication falls, and the latter
increasing as subsystem communication rises.
M
Emery summarizes this trade off in the following diagram. 3
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Figure 2
The cost curves in the above diagram will be determined by the
information processing or coordination technology of the firm. Thus
with the technology fixed, the firm will derive its optimum level of
subsystem communication and thus subsystem "independence".
Cost
5James C. Emery, Organizational Planning and Control -- Theory and
Technology, Doctoral Dissertation, M.I.T., Jan. 1967, p. 39.
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The Emergence of Hierarchical Organization
Since communication between subsystems is costly, there is an
incentive to transmit only the most "necessary" and the most "relevant"
information between them. Thus the production unit of our previous
examples, will not inform the sales unit of the daily maintenance
decisions it must make, but will notify it in the event of a serious
breakdown in machinery. Similarly the sales unit will notify the
production unit of only major changes in sales patterns. Thus the
"channel" will transmit selective information of a general nature.
Hierarchic information flows are structured to do just that.
A B
Figure 3
In Fig. 3, A-C-B, represents the "between system" information
channel. C represents the point at which information from A to B
is "matched" or "coordinated". Thus information that flows within A
and B is more detailed but less general than information that flows
to C.
__
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Note that in the abstract, hierarchical information flows do
not necessarily imply an inequitable distribution of "power". The
information processors and decision makers at C can be the "elected
representatives" of the members of A and B. But there is a clear
tendency for hierarchic flows to generate or magnify such an inequita-
ble distribution. This flows from the more general,more comprehensive
nature of information available to decision makers at C.4
Now we define the "span" of an organizational unit as the number
of subordinates with which it directly communicates. Thus, in Fig. 2,
the span of unit C is two. If we assume that the span in unchanging
throughout the organization, we can deduce some of the simple arith-
metic properties of "hierarchic" or "tree structure" models of organization. 5
4We can make this notion more explicit in the following way. Imagine
that information from A and B is required for organizational decision.
Information from A can be represented as some region along the X axis
of a graph while information from B can be represented as a region
along the Y axis. (We assume that the information comes in the form
of a region rather than a point, since all information is subject to
some margin of error.) Information to C then consists of the inter-
section of these two regions. This is shown in the following diagram.
Thus C has a more "exact" notion of the organization's "position"
than does either A or B.
5The arithmetic results are drawn from Emery. See, James C. Emery, op.
cit. pp. 52-53.
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Figure 4 represents a sales organization, where the bottom
four nodes represent the "primary" sales activities (e.g., sales in
four different regions) and the remaining nodes represent coordinat-
ing and decision making units. The span of the organization is two.
If we let L be the number of levels in the organization, S its
span, N the number of primary activities, and M the number of decision
making nodes, then it can be shown that
1) SL =N or L = No
2) M = N- 1/S -
9
therefore, if N is assumed constant
la) dL/dS < 0
2a) dM/dS < 0
Now we can heuristicall "prove" the following theorem
"For a fixed N as S falls, the 'amount' of information
exchange between subsystems falls."
To prove this we need only recall that as information moves from
one level to the next, it is coarsened. Detail is supressed as infor-
mation moves up the tree. Since we know that dL/dS < 0, as span falls
a piece of information from a given unit must move through a greater
number of levels before it can be "matched" with a piece of information
from any other unit. In turn we would expect, that as it moves
through a greater number of levels it becomes progressively more
coarsened. But presumably, more coarsened information is less infor-
mation. Thus, in effect, less information will be exchanged between
the two units at the "point of matching", i.e., at some node in the
hierarchy.
We can show this more explicitly by using information functions
to depict the amount of information flow over the tree.
U. -
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Figure 5
Consider organization A in Fig. 5. Imagine that the activity
of each primary node can be described as being in either one of two
states. (We will give a more specific example shortly.) Then the
total set of possible activities will be of the size 24 16. Now
in every period let each primary node signal its activity state to
its immediate "superior", who in turn transmits that information to
the central coordinator. We assume that total: "transmission" time
up the hierarchy takes only one period and every node "fires" only
once per period. We can see then that the central coordinator will
be able to receive information from a set of size 22 = i4i possible
states, even though the primary activities are in a set of 16 such
states. Thus the central coordinator receives in effect less infor-
mation as a result of information coarsening.
39
Another way of viewing this is to describe the communication
mechanism between primary nodes on and two (the left-hand nodes),
and primary nodes three and four. Clearly they can communicate
only through the central coordinator. Now nodes one and two can be
in one of four states, but the central coordinator perceives them as
being in only one of two states. Thus any information he gives to
three and four about the states of one and two will be coarsened.
As a result of the vertical movement of information up and down the
hierarchy information is lost. Nodes three and four have only an
incomplete picture of the activities of nodes one and two. However,
the more centralized organiztion B of Fig. 5 has no intervening nodes
between the primary activities and the central coordinator. The co-
ordinator receives full information from a set of 16 possible activity
states.
We can make this more rigorous by defining one of the possible
activities of the primary nodes (that is, each node engages in many
information transfers per period, one of which we will describe now).
---
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Figure 6
Let the organization in Fig. 6 represent an "~expanded" or-
ganization where the left-hand side is again our sales organization,
and the right the firm's production unit.
We imagine that in every period, the sales organization scans
a market area divided into four region, to determine which regions
within the area are about to order. The results of this scanning are
reported to the central coordinator who in turn unstructs the pro-
duction unit to produce a certain mix of goods for delivery. We
assume that the products to be delivered to each region are tailored
to the needs of each region so that for any order the production
unit must order a specific mix of raw materials. In effect, each
primary node specializes in scanning a given region of the market.
Now assume that in any period any combination of regions can order,
Pi = .5, i = 1 ...,4
be the probability that any given region will in fact order in some
specified period.
Under these assumptions there will be 16 equi-probable sets of
orders. Thus we can say that in each period the organization must
process 9oý2(16) = ¾i bits of information to make the correct production
decisions. (Or alternatively, since 1/16 = .0625, then
l1(.0625 , ... .0625 ) = where ii -i p. ) p.)
How will tihe information be coarsened as it moves tL) tche tree'
intutively we call see that coordinat ors C. and (C2 mIIis each[I trant Oli
a set: of four possible states into a set of two !possible states as lhe
trausmits information from the field to the central coordinator. We
can represent one such possible transformation with tile followitig
matrix. Let I represent will order and 0 represent will not order
I O
10 1
oI 1
00 1
II 1
Figure 7
The left-hand column represents the four possible combination
of orders from the field transmitted to coordinator C1 (or C2 ). The
I ---
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but that there can be only one order per region. For simplicity, we
let
42
entries in the matrix represent the probability that a given set of
orders from the field will be transformed into a given set of orders
to the central coordinator. Thus order (I,O) from the field will be
translated as (I) to the central coordinator with a probability of
one (where I represents the statement "orders from both regions").
Note that in the translation process, coordinators C1 and C2 are not
simply "parrots". They get information from the field which they must
interpret to determine which set of orders actually "holds". In turn
their "recommendations" along with the requisite information must be.
interpreted by the central coordinator.
Now in this transformation three out of four times C1 and C2 will
report orders from both regions. Thus the amount of information trans-
mitted from C1 and C2 will be 2(-.7524 .75- .25 4 .25) = 1.6 bits. Thus
four bits of information are transformed in 1.6 bits. 6
But as we saw before the organization represented in Fig. 5B, the
organization with the greater span will not coarsen its information
flow. At the central coordinator node where information from the entire
field meets, four bits or 100% of the information flow can be exchanged,
while only 1.6 bits or 40% can be exchanged in organization 5A.7
Now as Fig. 5 suggests a greater span for a fixed number of primary
activities implies a greater degree of centralization of organizational
6Note that the particular transformation matrix chosen in arbitrary.
But any matrix chosen must coarsen the information flow since a set of
two possibilities (1,0) cannot carry as much information as a set of
four possibilities.
7For a similar approach to coarsening that does not use information
functions see, Jacob Marschak, "Information Economics Reconsidered",
working paper #149, Western Management Science Institute, U.C.L.A.,
June 1969, §8
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activities. Thus we can say that the greater the communication
between the subsystems, i.e.y the greater the degree of information
exchange between them, the greater the degree of centralization
within the organization. Returning then to Fig. 2, depicted here
again in Fig. 8, we can now write on our X axis, "the degree of cen-
tralization" rather than the "degree of communication".8
So now we see that with a fixed information processing tech-
nology, the trade off between buffer and communication costs will
result in some degree of organizational centralization, with a con-
sequent organizational "average span".
I OR , TAO
Degree of Centralization
Figure 8
8This implicitly assumes that all communication is of the hierarchical
form. For a more detailed discussion of the assumptions behind this
graph see the appendix at the end of this chapter.
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§2. Channel Capacity as Minimum Average Cost
We can now return to the question posed in the Introduction. In
that way do information -- coordination -- costs, lead to a rising
cost of production? To answer this question we must develop more
rigorously, the relationship between the "rate of error". buffering,
and information processing capabilities.
Intuitively, the concept of "channel capacity" suggests a limit
to the amount of information that can be processed by a decision unit.
If we think in information theoretic terms, this suggests that there
is a limit to the "precision" of choice that any decision unit can
attain. Thus we know that the process of "decoding" entails the
selection of a single message from an ensemble of messages, where each
message occurs with a given probability. The more nearly equal in
probability are the messages the greater the information value of any
selection or decision. Thus, interpreted broadly, the more difficult
it is to detect differences between possible choices or decision, the
more information there is contained in the choice, the more information
is required to make the choice. But channel capacity is a "rate con-
cept", it is the flow of information per unit of time. A difference
may be difficult to detect, but if a great deal of time is spent in
searching for the difference it will be found. Thus, the less distinct
are choice possibilities, and/or the faster the rate at which such
choices are made, the greater the rate of information flow, Channel
capacity is thus a limit to the rate at which such choices can be
made without error.
ONote our emphasis on the concept of choices. It is tempting to think
of channel capacity as analogous to the maximal rate of water down a
pipe if the pipe is not to burst. But this is more analogous to "effort
capacity", i.e., how rapidly can a man perform a repetitive task that
entails no choice but simply exertion.
_
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Now we assume that a given organizational structure, the result
of a balancing of information and buffer costs results in, or generates
an organizational channel capacity with respect to the decision to
produce a certain bundle of goods when orders are obtained from the
"field". Thus let us look at Fig. 5A again. We can see that if
orders came in at the rate of one every two periods, and if each
could fire once per period, then there need not be any coarsening.
Coordinators C, and C2 could send the full four bits of information
by firing twice for every given set of orders. Thus the channel
capacity of the organization would be four bits every two periods,
or two bits per period. At this rate there would be no error in
the production decision. The firm would always produce the correct
set of goods.lo
More generally if we let A be the channel capacity of the or-
ganization and H be the bit value of the information field (in our
example of four bits), and if we assume again that P. = .5, i= 1,... N
where N is the number of regions (or primary activities) then,
R = A/H
1 0This does not imply that if orders came in at once every two periods,
there would be no need for any kind of organizational buffering. In-
formation transmitted for the production decision is only one of the
many kinds of information that must be transmitted in the course of
organizational operations, e.g., information concerning the internal
allocation of the firm's resources, the purchase of new materials, etc.
Rigorously speaking, even the production decision should be subject to
the information buffer trade-off. That is, irrespective of the rate
of output the firm could trade some information flow from t the sales
to the production unit for an inventory stock. However, for the sake
of our discussion we separate out the production decision. We imagine
that the buffer-information tradeoff is determined for the sales or-
ganization of Fig. 4 which then determines the channel capacity for the
production decision of the expanded organization in Fig. 5.
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where R is the maximal rate of output, or delivery of orders sustaina-
bl1 4 1-1
e w t out error.
Now let us say that the firm wishes 
t
L greater than R. Theoretically it would have to process LH > A bits
of information. However, were it to try to do this we would expect
its rate of error to rise, i.e., it could be increasingly less success-
ful in predicting which combination of regions was about to order. If
we let P(e) be the probability that any decision will be wrong, then
intuitively we would expect
dP(e)/d(L- R) > 0
We can show this more rigorously in the following way. The or-
ganization must process LH bits of information, but in fact can only
process A. Thus as L rises H must fall. The only way in which H can
fall is if the organization implicitly "bunches" some of the sets of
regions together. That is, it begins to ignore differences so that
"processed" H is less than actual H. Bunching will reduce processed
H since the organization implicitly reduces the number of sets or orders
it must choose from (which in our original case was 16). By reducing
the number of sets it constructs larger sets whose probabilities are
larger than the original sets. Thus in our original case we had an
information field of value H(.06251,... ,62516 4 bits. But after
1 1 ln units we have,
(Orders/Decision)(Bits/time)/(Bits/Decision) = Orders/Time
where decision means choosing one of the K possible combinations of
orders. Note that since pi = .5, (Orders/Decision) = 1, i.e., if
there are four possible combinations, (IO, II, 01, 00), then there
are four I's.
L r
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exceeding A the new or processed information field could look like
H(.25, .25, .25, .25) = 2 bits, where each new set of probability .25
is composed of four old sets.
k
More generally processed H will be H(> pi ý Pk+l .Pn ) while
actual H will be H(pl.. .p). But we know from the definition of
information functions that
k k
H(pl...n = H( pi + Pk+1"''n )  Pi H(p ... p/)
where
k
Pi = Pi/ Pi
Thus processed H is less than actual H, or symbolically,
H(s) < H(a)
Now clearly d(H(a) -H(S))/d(L- R) > 0, and we can assume dP(e)/d(H(a) -
H(s)) > 0 so that dP(e)/d(L - R) > 0.
More generally if we let Q be the level of output we can
write
dP(e)/dQ = 0 Q < R
>0 Q>R
However, as the probability of error rises the firm will be less
and less successful in delivering its goods to the proper customer.
(Remember we assumed that the goods were tailored to the specific
1 2 For the proof of this theorem, and for a good introduction to in-
formation theory in general see, Elwyn Edwards, Information Trans-
mission, Chapman and Hall, London, 1964. The theorem is found on
page )Il.
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needs of each region.) Thus if it is to deliver its goods, it will
have to maintain an inventory of finished goods so that when the un-
expected customer drops in it will not let him leave empty-handed.
In other words, levels of output greater than R require some stock
of inventories. But how much? We can get a feel for the requisite
size and cost of the inventory stock by constructing a simple inventory
model.
Thus imagine that there are only two rather than four regions,
but that again the probability of order from each region is .5. We
can then construct a table that relates the true or actual set of
orders in any period to the firm's guess about which set will be
ordered.
I0 O 00 II
I0 (1-P) P' P' P'
OI P' (1-P) P' P'
00 P' P' (1-P) P'
II P' P' P' (1-P)
Figure 9
P is the probability of error and P' = P/3. Thus we have assumed
for simplicity, that the error is distributed equally among the dif-
ferent possibilities. Thus, if the combination II "holds", i.e.,
both regions order, then the probability that no goods will be pro-
duced that period, i.e., the firm guesses, 00, will be P/3. We can
I
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view this table as an "input-output" matrix where the order is the
input and the guess about the order is the output. 1 3
Now the firm's rate of information transmission will be given
as H(input)+H(output)- H(input, output). 1 4 Now H(input) and H(output)
are each two bits each so that transmission is zero when H(input, output)
is four bits. Since there are 16 entries in H(input, output), it can be
four only when all the entries are equiprobable, or 1- P = P/3 or
P = 3/4. That is, when the probability of error is 3/4, the pro-
bability of being correct is equal to the probability of a mistake
so that information transmission is zero.
Now let us consider the following set of "inventory policies"
for the orders of one region only. (Call it region A, and the goods
produced for that region
If decisions are made at a rate of D per period, then we say
that there are D decision intervals per time period. We define an
inventory policy X as the average percent of intervals in which a
unit of goods A will be stored as inventory. Or, X represents the
probability that in any given interval a unit of goods A will be
kept on the shelves. Clearly the "maximal" policy will be represented
as X = 1, since in this case a unit of goods A will be stored every
1 3Note that this matrix is not to be confused with the matrix trans-
formation we constructed in §1. There it exhibited the coarsening
process as information went from one node to the next. It involved
the reduction of a set of four orders to a set of two orders. This
matrix presumably represents the final effect of all coarsening,
judgments, guesses, etc. made along the whole hierarchy.
1 4For a more careful definition of transmission see Chapter Three.
Transmission is also defined in Edwards, op. cit., p. 54.
interval. In this case the rate of error will have no effect on the
ability of the organization to deliver orders for A, since any error
will be compensated for by drawing down on the "unit stock" of in-
ventories of A.
Let us assume that the organization determines some optimal rate
of "order completion", i.e., the proportion of orders it wishes to
fill. In addition, we assume that since no provision is made for
storing the goods produced for the other region (call it B), units
of B produced as a consequence of error are disposed of. We make a
parallel assumption for goods A. In other words, the inventory stock
is built up only as a result of planned decisions.
Now let D be the rate of decisions, X the inventory policy,
and P the rate of error. Now as can be seen in Fig. 9, there will
be eight times when an order is not anticipated correctly, four for
A and four for B. Thus the expected number of missed orders per de-
cision interal will be given as
8(P/3)(1) 15
Then if the total number of decisions made per time period is
D, then
8(P/3) ()D
will be the number of orders missed, and since the total number
of orders is equal to the number of decision intervals per time period
(since the probability of order is .5) then, 8(P/3)(4)
15 1 appears in the formula because each combination of orders occurs
with a probability of .
0
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will be the proportion of orders missed. Then when P = 2 and trans-
mission is zero only half the orders will be filled.
If we let 4(1)(!) be written as F and if we remember that X is
the inventory policy for goods A and we let Q be the level of orders,
then FPQ/2 will be the number of orders of B missed while FP(1- X)Q/2
will be the number of A missed. The proportion of orders completed
will therefore be
-FP- FP(1- X) 1-LFP(2-X)
1 2 2
Now we assumed that the firm fixes some rate of completion of orders,
call it RC.
Then we know that
FP
1 -FP < RC < - since O < X < 1
Thus we can write RC as
1 - YPF where O < Y <
Then since RC is fixed, we have
dRC = 3RC/ýY(dY) + aRC/oP(dP) = O , or
-FPdY = FYdP
so that
dY/dP = -Y/P O < Y <2
However, we know that
1 - YFP = 1 - FP(2 -X)
so that
I
L= __
im
2(1 -Y) = X
and since
dX/dP = (dX/dY)(dY/dP)
we have
dX/dP = ½(2- X/P) > O
so that the rate of buffering varies directly with the rate of error.
Now what will be the average cost of production? Cost will be
the sum of actual production, storage costs and inventory production
S16costs. 16
If we assume constant returns to scale in production, then average
cost of production can be given as K. Total storage costs will be
given as costs of storage per decision interval or S times the number
of decision intervals in which a unit of goods A is stored, DX or
SDX. But since the number of orders Q = D, this can be written as
SQX. But how many goods are actually produced? Since we assumed
that the rate of error is distributed equally among all the possible
sets of orders, this means that the number of orders is equal to the
number of goods produced. (Though of course only a certain fraction
of the goods ordered will be successfully matched with the goods pro-
duced.) So the unit storage cost per goods produced can be written
SX. Average inventory production cost will be given as the inventory pol-
icy X,, times the number of decision intervals divided by the amount
1 6 We ignore "penalty" costs, since we are interested in deriving the
resource rather than the opportunity costs of production. That is,
we wish to discover the cost limitations to organizational growth,
not whether or not growth is optimal.
I
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of production, times the average cost of production or KXQ/Q = KX. 1 7
Thus total average cost of production will be given by
K +X(S + K)
Now as we saw before if A is the channel capacity of the organization
and H the bit value of the sales region (in our case one bit) then
R = A/H was the maximal rate of output sustainable without error.
Higher rates of order resulted in "information overload" and an
increase in "bunching". This means that the information system
begins to ignore differences so that potential orders from different
regions can no longer be distinguished. As we saw from Fig. 9, a
higher P means a lower rate of information transmission. Thus at
the rate of orders exceeds channel capacity, the amount of information
transmitted along the organization's information system falls and the
rate of error rises. But as we say for a fixed RC, dP/dX > 0, so
that as Q exceeds A/H, X must rise. But since average cost of pro-
duction is given as K+X(S+K) then the average cost of production
must also rise. (Note that the expression for average cost can be
thought of as the sum of average production cost plus average infor-
mation cost, where buffers represent the implicit cost of information.
1 7Note that in our model there is no replacement of inventory. The
inventory policy X does not state that there should be a certain
stock at any given moment, but rather in some proportion of randomly
chosen intervals there will be a unit of A.
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So exceeding channel capacity results in a constant average cost of
production but a rising information cost.
Graphically this can be represented in the following way:
Cost P 4 > P 3 ...
Q = R
Output
Figure 10
Each line represents average cost for a specified X and thus
for an implied rate of error P. Then for a given RC as Q rises so
does P. Thus average cost of production is a "crosscut" of these
constant cost lines. The faster P rises with Q the steeper will be
the average cost of production curve.
Thus we see that channel capacity is the "dual" of minimum
average cost. In information theory, exceeding channel capacity
will result in an information loss that varies directly with the
I
difference between the uncertainty of the input and the channel
capacity. In our case, exceeding channel capacity results in a rate
of error and average cost that varies directly with the point of pro-
duction and the point of minimum average cost.18
Clearly our model is very simplified, but it does capture the
way in which the buffering rate X rises with increases in the error
rate, and under some simple assumptions we can see how this will
generate a rising average cost of production. Richard Meier1 9 shows
that one of the major elements in "transactions overload", particularly
for public service institutions, is the investment cost in "queuing"
procedures as the rate of completion falls behind the order rate.
While private institutions can simply sell to the highest bidder,
too high a rate of output will strain internal channel capacities, so
that queuing problems will develop within the organization leading to
rising organizational costs.
To summarize, we have seen that the costs of information trans-
fer and buffer stock maintenance will lead to an organizational
structure that tends to minimize coordination costs. In turn such a
18Note that our model implicitly assumes that the cost of general in-
formation transfer and internal buffering is directly proportional
to output, so that the average cost of such operations is constant.
This will be strictly true if there are no fixed costs to such
operations. Where there are such fixed costs, it is quite possible
for the point of minimum average cost to be slightly to the right
of the point of channel capacity. This point is taken up in more
detail in the appendix to this chapter. For the purpose of our
argument here, we assume that the average cost K includes both
average production cost, and average information buffer cost.
1 9Richard Meier, A Communications Theory of Urban Growth, M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1962, p. 81.
I
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structure will generate a channel capacity for the firm's production
decision. Exceeding that channel capacity will result in a rising
average cost of production, that in the end sets a limit to organiz-
ational size.
I
§3. Growth Through Structural Differentiation
We have seen that growth in the scale of production operations
combined with a fixed channel capacity, i.e., a fixed information
processing capability, will ultimately lead to a rising average cost
of production. But information processing capabilities need not be
limited. The number of decision makers can be increased. The
lonely coordinators of Fig. 6 can find partners to assist them in
the decision making processes. Thus an increase in the scale of
both information and production operations should not a priori lead
to a rising average cost of over-all operation. But it is clear that
as the amount of information resources expands at each node in the
hierarchy, or in each subsystem of the organization, the problem of
intra-nodal coordination arises. How are the decisions within each
node or subsystem to be coordinated, as the number of decisions, rate
of decision making and information resources increase within each node?
In other words, increases in scale generates a coordination problem,
that if unresolved, will obviate any increase in channel capacity.
Perhaps the most likely solution will be the further differenti-
ation of decision making labor, i.e., a division of decision making
labor and a greater specialization of such labor. This proposition is
of course simply a variant of the oldest theorem in economics, "the
division of labor is limited by the extent of the market", or in our
case growth in organizational output generates further structural
differentiation or specialization within the organization.
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We continue to assume, however, that there are only four differ-
ent products corresponding to the original four regions, and that in
any decision interval there can be no more than one order per (original)
region. (The probability of order from each region is again .5.)
Under these assumptions, Coordinators C3 through C6 each scan the fol-
lowing information field.
Set Probability
10 .25
01 .25
II .50
Figure 12
Since we have assumed that the probability of order from each of the
original four regions is still .5, the sum of the probabilities of
the sets IO and OI (one order from each of the new "subregions") must
sum to .5. Thus we assume that each of these subsets occurs with a
probability of .25. The set II cannot occur since this would imply
two orders from one of the original regions in a given decision
interval -- contrary to our assumption of only one order per region
in any given decision interval.
Each of the coordinators C3 through C6 will use the following
transformation matrix in reporting to his superior.20
20Unlike the matrix in Fig. 7, this one is not "arbitrarily" chosen.
IO0 and 01 both mean a single order from one of the original four
regions, while 00 means no order from that region. Sillcc I-roml tHlie
perspective of production, we are interested only in orders Iromi
the original four regions, IO and OI naturally translate into I
and 00 to 0.
I ---
-I
I 0
10 1
01 1
00 1
Figure 13
From the transformation in Fig. 13, it can be seen that both coordi-
nators C, and C2 scan a field of two bits each.
21 So after the first trans-
formation the organization reduces its six bit field into four bits. But
since there are only four different products corresponding to the original
four regions, and since there can be no more than one order from each region
per period, the organization will need only four bits for a correct pro-
duction decision.
Then of what value were the extra two (6-4) bits of information that
are picked up as a result of specialization? Presumably, specialization
or the division of labor should increase the productivity of such labor.
Or in our terms, the rate at which the individual nodes can process and
transmit information should increase.
One way of seeing this is to view coordinator C, as being assisted
by coordinators C3 and C4 in the scanning of the primary field. The task
of scanning now has been divided up so that C3 and C4 do the initial scan-
ning work, while at the same time the primary nodes need now survey on an
even smaller region of the market area. Thus coordinator C1 now receives
more refined information which is presumably more easy to take up and transmit.
Similarly the central coordinator will also receive more refined data so that
the rate at which he can absorb information is also increased. In short, we
would expect the increasing division of labor to increase nodal channel
capacity. Thus let us imagine that the channel capacity ol tI1w o(tglaIlizat i0,o
21 That is, coordinator C1 receives I and 0 each with a probability of .5,
from both coordinators C3 and C4 for a total of (1+ 1) = 2 bits.
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now rises from two to four bits per period, so that in effect the points
of minimum average cost "shifts to the right". Under these assumptions
there would seem to be no limit to organizational growth since con-
tinued structural differentiation should lead to greater and greater
channel capacity and thus a constant average cost line.
What limits are there to specialization or structural differ-
entiation?22
We can get some sense of the limits to specialization by recalling
the complementarity between information and buffers. In Mathematics
and Computers in Soviet Economic Planning, 2 Richard Judy notes that
"as the economy grows more complex even the development of a feasible
plan is beyond the power of the system".24 He then goes on to quote
the Soviet Economist, Aganbegian
"...because of the growing interconnections of its
(economy) sectors, the flow of information in the
economy expands as the square (and sometimes the
cube) of the expansion in the volume of production."2 5
If we interpret "complexity" and "interconnectedness" as the con-
comitants of structural differentiation this "squared" law of growth can
be informally explained.
J.H. Stevens deals explicitly with this question, but his results are
not strictly applicable here. Stevens assumes increasing specializ-
ation but a fixed channel capacity, i.e.. specialization without struc-
tural differentiation, so that the central coordination is not assisted
in his scanning by intervening nodes. See, C.H. Stevens, op. cit., Chap. 3.
23Richard W. Judy, "Information, Control, and Soviet Economic Management",
in Mathematics and Computers in Soviet Economic Planning, ed., J. Hardt,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967.
24Richard W. Judy, op. cit., p. 15.
2 5Richard W. Judy, op. cit., p. 15.
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Intuitively we can see that part of this squared law derives
from the mathematics of combinations. If we imagine a communications
network composed of pairwise links then the number of links will be
given by
=N ()(N2 - N)
so that for large N the number of links will rise approximately with
the square of the number of units. If we imagine that volume was
proportional to the number of units then we can derive a rough variant
of our squared law.
But this argument will not apply strictly for our organizational
problem, since a central function of hierarchical information flows
is to economize on the number of such pairwise links. More important,
if information processing capabilities are fixed, no unit could process
the amount of information required to maintain a growing number of such
links.
Part of the answer lies in the complementarity between information
and buffers. As Fig. 11 suggests structural differentiation with a
constant span means a greater number of component parts in the organ-
ization. Thus each component or node communicates with a proportion
ately smaller part of the organization as the degree of specialization
increases. 26
2 6The assumption of a constant span is consistent with the notion that
the information processing technology remains fixed. The channel
capacity increases not because the information technology improves,
but only because of specialization within the framework of a fixed
technology.
In ---
I --
One way of looking at this is to note that in the old organiz-
ation of Fig. 5A coordinator C1 scanned a two bit field in an or-
ganization that processed a total of four bits, or 50% of the infor-
mation flow, while in the organization of Fig. 12, he scans two out
of a total of six bits or 33% of the organization's information flow.
In other words, as specialization increases the nodes or components
in the organization process a smaller and smaller proportion of the
organization' information flow. More generally, each node has a less
comprehensive view of organizational processes. In other words, our
coordinators find themselves in positions of interdependence with an
increasing number of units but have no way of perceiving that inter-
dependence. Information processing capabilities (expressed by the
size of the average span, in this case two) do not keep pace with the
growing interdependencies.
It is here that we would expect buffers to play a crucial role.
The nodes or component parts of any organization must accommodate to
their interdependencies, they cannot be caught short by unexpected
strains and demands that arise from other parts of the organization.
Thus we would expect that the amount of buffers maintained should rise
with the increasing division of labor. 2 7 We can express this more
rigorously in the following way.
Let G be the proportion of information flow processed by a de-
cision making node. Let DS be the degree of specialization, i.e.,
2 7For a different approach to the problem of specialization and
growth see, Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Theory and Organizational
Analysis, Harper and Bros., New York, 1960, Chapter 8.
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the "fineness" of the partition of the market area, N is again the
number of primary nodes and M the number of coordinating nodes. I
is the amount, in money terms, of buffers maintained by any decision
making unit. Then we assume
I = f(G) f' <0
but as we suggested, and as seems intuitively plausible,
G = f(DS) f' < 0
but by definition
DS = f(N) f' > 0
so that
G = f(N) f' < 0
but also
dM/dN > 0
so that
I = f(M) f > 0O
if we now write arbitrarily,
I = kM k>O
and we assume k is the same for each coordinating unit we then have
the total organizational cost
I = kM2
Now how will such buffer costs affect the cost of production?
N3 > N2 > N1
K
Figure 14
In the above figure we draw in different average cost of pro-
duction curves corresponding to different degrees of specialization.
K represents the sum of the average cost of production plus the average
cost of information transfer also assumed constant. (See footnote 19,
this chapter.) As we saw in section two of this chapter, a given or-
ganizational structure generates a channel capacity with respect t.o
the production decision, and thus a rising average cost of production
once channel capacity is exceeded. Thus each curve has a point of
minimum average cost, corresponding to its channel capacity. As the
figure suggests, organizations with a greater degree of specialization,
will have a higher channel capacity, so that there points of minimum
average cost will lie further to the right. (Curves with greater chan-
nel capacity will have higher fixed costs because to increase the number
II
N1 . I F-·il
of decision making nodes it must increase the amount of decision
making labor. Thus at low levels of output they suffer from excess
capacity and "overspecialization".)
If we let specialization be expressed as a continuous index,
then it is clear that the long run cost curve for the firm will be
the straight line envelope with height K. Each level of output on
the long run curve represents a given value of N and thus some spe-
cified degree of specialization. If we let Q be output then we can
write
Q = hN h > O
but since
M = N - I/S - 1
then
N = (S- 1)M+ 1 (S -1)M
so that
Q = h(S-1)M or M = Q/(S- 1)h 2 8
but since buffer cost I' is given by
I' = kM2
we can write
I' = kQ2/(S- 1)2h2 = VQ2
where
V = k/(S -1)2 h2
28S is span which is assumed constant over the whole envelope. The
formula relating M, N and S can be found on page
I
Thus long term average buffer cost will be given as
I'/Q = VQ
so that the long term total average cost of production will be
K + VQ
which clearly rises with output. Thus once again we can see that
there will be coordination limits to organizational growth.
In summary we have seen that structural differentiation within
the framework of constant information processing technology, expressed
as some fixed average span, generates a higher channel capacity through
the process of specialization. But the fixed information processing
technology leads to coordination problems as the number of subsystems
or nodes within the organization increases. These coordination prob-
lems result in rising buffer costs with a consequent rising average
cost of production. This rising average cost will thus pose limits
to organizational growth.
I - --
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§4. Growth Through Restructuring and the Emergence of
Information Capital
We have seen that a fixed information processing or coordination
technology, expressed as an optimal degree of coordination, or optimal
average span, imposes cost limitations on growth. A given organiz-
ational structure generates a fixed channel capacity with respect to
the production decision, which when exceeded results in a rising
average cost of production due to rising inventory costs. Similarly,
structural differentiation with a fixed span permits a rising channel
capacity, but at the cost of rising average buffer cost.
Thus we would expect that an improvement in the information pro-
cessing technology should lead to increases in channel capacity. We
can explore the dynamics of this process by returning to Fig. 2.
/tIhORM ATtON
Costr
U TTE7R
DEGREE of EN R jLizAT o ri
im
0
69
We represent a technological improvement in the information
technology by letting the cost of information curve shift to the
right. This results in a lower total coordination cost and a higher
degree of centralization. This results in the elimination of some of
the intervening nodes (between the field and the central coordinator --
the classic "middle level management") so that coordination is achieved
with a smaller amount of information resources. Why should this im-
provement result in a higher channel capacity? The key lies of course
in the increased centralization. There will be less coarsening as in-
formation moves up and down the hierarchy so that a greater proportion
of the bit value from the field is relayed to the central coordinator.
(This was explicitly demonstrated when we compared organizations 5A and
5B in Fig. 5.)
However, if we return to Fig. 5. we see that greater centralization
means that the central coordinator must be able to process information
at a faster rate, not only information with respect to the production
decision but also information with respect to all other organizational
operations. In our study of structural differentiation we found that
the coordinator could process information at a faster rate because of
greater specialization. The data was more refined and easier to "handle"
as a result of the division of labor. But no such specialization occurs
with centralization.
The key lies in our concept of Information Capital. An increase
in the amount of information to the central coordinator is useless unless
it is matched by an ability to structure or pattern this increased flow.
1
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In Management Information Systems - New Directions, Z. Zannetos de-
scribes the case of the manager who when confronted with reams of
computer output, but no guide to its perusal, simply chucks the whole
affair in the wastepaper basket, and continues tomake decisions in
the old ad hoc fashion.2 9 Thus if increases in the flow of information
are to result in an increase in channel capacity, it must be matched
by the development of a model, by the growth of information capital,
that increases the productivity of "information labor". Thus central-
ization can lead to increases in channel capacity only if the tech-
nological improvements entail the development of information capital.
One way of seeing this is to note that organizational structure
functions as an "implicit model". By generating certain kinds of in-
formation interactions and repressing others, it performs a selecting
function, choosing to focus on certain relationships and ignoring
others. As a model does, it structures information by choosing one
set of "information matches" out of a large set of such matches. But
as is suggested by Fig. 5, centralization reduces such organizational
selectivity by reducing or simplifying organizational structure. Thus
as the organization comes to structure information less and less an
explicit model replaces organizational structure. We emphasize the
word "explicit" since a consciously designed model reveals the full
patterns of interaction to those members of the organization who have
full access to the model. It is very much a "self image". An
29Zennon Zannetos,"Management Information Systems--New Directions", mimeo,
Sloan School, M.I.T., March, 1967.
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organization, on the other hand, is very much like the famed "in-
visible hand". No member of the organization has or need have a
full view of organizational interactions. Like a market an organ-
ization can add up a series of "fragmented" views. Thus the emer-
gence of information capital entails the substitution of a consciously
designed model for organizational structure as the tool for patterning
information.
Let us now return to Fig. 15 reproduced here as Fig. 16.
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As we show in Fig. 16, organizational costs can be reduced by
lowering buffer costs at every level of organizational centralization.
Such a technological improvement will lead to a greater degree of
organizational decentralization. How will this affect channel capacity,
the rate at which the organization can process information without error?
I
We would expect that any technological improvement in infor-
mation technology, such as represented by the downward shift in the
buffer curve will lead to an increase in channel capacity. But how
is this possible if as a consequence the degree of decentralization
increases? Won't information coarsening increase, and as a conse-
quence channel capacity fall?
Part of the key to this "paradox" lies of course in our original
definitions. When we equated the degree of communication between
subsystems with the degree of centralization (see §1, p.4 3), we im-
plicitly assumed that all communication was of the hierarchic form
only (i.e., information can flow only in a "vertical" direction).
An increase in decentralization would be consistent with a rising
channel capacity if, in fact, non-hierarchic forms of communication
were permitted. This in fact is the most natural interpretation of
the downward shift in the buffer cost curve.
The downward shift in this curve implies that at any level of
centralization, the individual subsystems are better able to take
into account the actions of other units on their own operations and
thus need fewer buffers. In effect, the units are better able to co-
ordinate themselves. The only way this is possible with an increase
in the degree of decentralization, and thus a decrease in hierarchic
information flows, is if non-hierarchic communication links are set
up between the units, that substitute for and are cheaper than buffers.
In other words, we interpret the buffer curve to include the cost of
buffers and the cost of non-hierarchic (i.e., direct or "horizontal")
I
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communications. A downward shift in this curve results in the pro-
gressive substitution of cheaper horizontal communication links for
buffer. Thus improvements in information processing technologies
are "double edged". They can be used to decentralize organizations
by developing a technology of horizontal communication links between
all the sybsystems or by improving the efficiency of hierarchical
information flows.30
We can better understand the technology of horizontal communication
links, if we assume that the subsystmes coordinate themselves through
a "data base" that records the actions of all units and to which all
units have access. The data base permits each unit to have a "total"
view of organizational activities. Thus communicating through the
data base permits direct information transfer without coarsening. It
is for this reason that the channel capacity of the organization can
increase. We can see that the data base is "integrative". It permits
closer coordination of activities by reducing the need for buffers that
separate the subsystems. Thus an increase in coordination is consistent
with a decrease in centralization.
We can approach this process of decentralization in another way.
If the subsystems are going to be able to process the increasing flow
of information through the data base, they will require, as in the case
of greater centralization, information capital, a model that enables
them to structure this increased flow. Access to the "comprehensive"
:-oAdmittedly, this ignores the costs of goal formulation. We are dis-
cussing the costs of coordination once goals are set.
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or "total" will prove impossible without a model to pattern organ-
izational information. Thus the process of decentralization that
increases coordination results from a decentralization or democratic
distribution of the organization's information capital.
There are thus two kinds of decentralization. An organization
will be decentralized if given a fixed information processing tech-
nology, the organization is so structured so as to reduce the proportion
of information flow to the central coordinator, without increasing the
proportion of this flow to any other unit. Such a decentralization
will result in a lower degree of coordination and thus a lower channel
capacity. The other mode of decentralization consists in increasing
the proportion of organizational information flow to each subsystem
within the organization by democratically distributing the information
capital.
However, whether information capital is used to centralize or de-
centralize organizational structure, its emergence is always a de-
structive process. It always destroys decision making prerogatives,
whether these be the prerogatives of the "traditional elites" or the
prerogatives of their subordinates. The emergence of information
capital, thus entails the emergence of new levels of organizational
conflict. (This is taken up in detail in Chapter 4.)
In summary, if an organization is to continue to grow, it must
increase its channel capacity by developing information capital. But
the development of such capital can be double edged. It can result in
I
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greater centralization if the information capital is located in-
creasingly in the central coordinating node, or it can lead to
greater decentralization, to the progressive elimination of a "center"
as the point where information from the entire organization is co-
ordinated, if the information capital is democratically distributed.
This we shall argue sets the stage for political conflict around
decision making prerogatives. The potential inherent in the develop-
ing information processing technologies points to a more democratic
yet more coordinated decision making. Yet the prerogatives of those
in power may lead to a suppression of this potential in the interests
of less democratic and more centralized modes of decision making.
I --
Summary
We can summarize our discussion by way of the implicit "taxonomy"
of organizational growth developed in this chapter. The chart below
lists both the forms of growth and the information limits to growth.
We like to view the chart as outlining a sequential process.
Form of Growth Information Limit
1) growth in scale, fixed rising rate of error
channel capacity leads to rising average
inventory cost
2) growth in scale of infor- problem of "intra-nodal"
mation and material resources coordination
3) growth through structural channel capacity increases
differentiation (implies but buffer cost rises more
an increase in material than in proportion to
and information resources) output
4) growth through "restructur-
ing", and reintegration
through the development of
information capital.
tWe think of this as a "transitional stage" as greater scale
permits a greater division of labor.
Often it is at this point that the organization will "spin
off" some of its subsystems. The costs and function of co-
ordination are then taken over by the market.
The central analytic points that emerged from our discussion can
be listed as follows:
1) Buffer costs are the dual of information costs. The balanc-
ing of the two leads to an optimum degree of centralization.
I
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APPENDIX
This appendix is for the reader who would like to see all the
implicit assumptions and details hidden in the footnotes of the text
brought together in one place.
Our buffer-information curve diagram showed how an organization
will arrive at its optimal degree of centralization. For the pur-
poses of our argument we assumed that these curves include all trade-
offs except that between sales information and inventory stock. Thus
the tradeoffs can include allocation of the firm's resources between
the subsystems, new investments by the subsystems, forms of excess
capacity, and operations with high fixed costs that are not shared
effectively. Lack of communication between subsystems with respect
to all these operations can lead to "suboptimization", duplication,
and forms of excess capacity. All these results are encompassed
under the general terms of "buffers".
We assumed that these tradeoffs determined an organizational
degree of communication for the sales organization depicted in Fig. 4.
We then argued that a given degree of communication implies a given
degree of centralization, implicitly restricting communication to
hierarchic information flows. A given degree of centralization then
generates a channel capacity with respect to the production decision,
i.e., for the expanded organization in Fig. 5.
Rigorously speaking, the information buffer curves of our basic
diagram must be specified with respect to some level of output, since
for some degree of centralization the higher the level of output, the
I - -
higher both the cost of information and buffers. However, we im-
plicitly assumed that once the firm finds its optimal organizational
structure, this structure will prove optimal, i.e.. will result in
the lower total coordination cost, over all levels of output. For
this to be true, the shifts in the information and buffer curves must
exactly offset one another. This is shown in Fig. 18, where as a result
of these shifts the same structure, the same degree of centralization
is preserved over all levels of output.
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Is there any reason to expect such an offsetting shift in the
curves?
We can understand the problem better by thinking in terms of
cost curves. Thus if every organizational structure generates a
M
cost curve of coordination over different levels of output our as-
sumption implies that the cost curve of the optimal structure lies
everywhere below the cost curves of any other organizational
structure. This is shown in Fig. 19.
*-OPT tAt
Output
Figure 18
However, when we usually think of choosing the best cost curve
from a set of curves we usually have the following "picture" in mind:
I
Figure 19
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Thus we imagine that cost curves that are more efficient over
higher levels of output are less efficient over lower levels of out-
put. But this is because we associate this greater efficiency with
higher fixed costs. We imagine that the greater efficiency is the
result of more capital intensive modes of production that entail a
higher level of maintenance expenditure.
In our case the parallel to different capital intensities that
generate different modes of production are different organizational
structures. But structure per se does not cost.31 There are no fixed
cost differentials to different structure. Different structures simply
represent different ways of organizing a constant complement of human
and material resources within the framework of a given coordination
technology. 2 Thus we would expect that an organizational structure
optimal at one level of output will be optimal at all levels of out-
put. 3 3 It is for this reason that we would expect the shifts in the
buffer and information curves to be mutually offsetting.
We cannot determine a priori how all buffer and information
costs will vary with the level of output.
31This is a point that emerges very clearly from Leibenstein's studies
of X-efficiency. See Harvey Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency vs.
X-efficiency", American Economic Review, June 1966, 392-415.
32Note that this is not inconsistent with the assumption of higher
fixed costs for structure of a greater degree of specialization.
The specialization is achieved through the addition of human and
material resources.
33To give an analogy, a smart fellow will solve problems better than
a stupid one whether the problems are hard or easy.
I
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Figure 20
In Fig. 20, Q* represents the point of channel capacity with
respect to the production decision. Now clearly, (TC2 -TC 1)/TC1 can be
less than equal to, or greater than (Q2- Qi)/Q1, so that there can
be increasing returns to such information-buffer costs particularly
if there are fixed costs to such operations. However, just as the
production decision has a channel capacity point, so we would expect
other such decision or information transfers to have their channel
capacity points. Beyond these points we would expect the information-
buffer costs to rise more than in proportion to output, for reasons
similar to those which we discussed with respect to tlice prodluction
M
83
decision. However, these channel capacity points, call them
Q ,..•Qn', may not coincide with the channel capacity with respect
to the production decision, Q*. Thus, if Qi > Q*, then the point
of minimum average cost would lie to the right of Q*, and minimum
average cost would be a "weighted average" of the different channel
capacity.
0i
INFORMATION CAPITAL
from the Perspective of Software
84
Chapter Three
THE MODEL AS A CAPITAL GOOD
Introduction
We have emphasized throughout the previous chapters that an
increased flow of information can be useless or even counterproductive,
if not matched by an improved ability to structure or pattern such
information. Hardware innovations require software development to
harness the "information explosion". Software can be thought of as
a set of models that pattern and channel information. Thus, we would
expect that the "productivity" of information flows would depend on
the quality of the model. Intuitively we would expect that models
that reveal little of the inherent structure in the field or environ-
ment will be less productive, less useful than those that expose the
interdependencies and interrelationships. We will say that the latter
more "sophisticated" models contain more structure than the naive ones.
We will show how models of greater structure possess a greater "channel
capacity" and how as a consequence the average cost of sampling falls
as model structure rises.
In §1 we present an intuitive view of these propositions anti-
cipating in part the conclusions of Part Two. In §2 we establish a
more rigorous exposition. The thrust of this chapter is to establish
the relationship or "duality" between "better" models, the Shannon
concept of channel capacity, and average cost. This student did not
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possess the requisite skills to prove the "general case". Nevertheless,
the results are consistent with our original intuition and are sug-
gestive as to how proofs might be generalized.
I
We said that more sophisticated models possess a greater amount
of "structure". This concept can be quantified. Thus imagine that
a coordinator or decision maker must consider two variables in his
or her decision making process. These variables might represent
data on the internal processes of an organization, or data from the
organization's external "field". The two variables are characterized
by a joint probability distribution as shown in Fig. 1. Each variable
can assume only one of two states
X xI  x2
Y Y1  .5 .25 (.75)
Y2  .125 .125 (.25)
(.625) (.375) 1.0
Figure I
The amount of "structure" in this joint probability distribution
is given by the information analogue of the "degree of corellation".
Thus, if we let Structure be equal to S, we have
S = H(x) + H(y) - H(x,y)
where H(x), H(y) are information value of the marginal distributions
of x and y and H(x,y) is the information value of their joint distri-
bution. Thus, we have in our example l
1The term structure is called the "transmission" between two variables
by Quastler and McGill.
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S = H(.75, .25)+ H(.625, .375) - H(.5, .25,.125, .125)= .015 bits.
Now we assume that the table given in Fig. 1 is in fact correct,
that it represents the true probability distribution of the organiz-
ation's relevant field. We define a model of complete ignorance as
one whose structure is zero. Since in fact different configurations
of probabilities will lead to a model of structure zero, we restrict
our range of consideration to that class of models where the marginal
distributions are unchanged. Thus, every model reflects a correct
understanding of the marginal distributions of x and y but differing
conceptions of their joint probability, of their dependence.
Under such conditions it can be shown that the model of zero
structure is given, not unexpectedly, by the model where P(x,y) =
P(x)P(y). That is the probability P of the joints is given by the
multiplication of the respective marginals, i.e., the variables are
assumed to be orthogonal.
In Fig. 2 we present the model of zero structure for the field
given in Fig. 1.
X X1  x2
Y Y1  .46 .29 (.75)
Y2  .165 .085 (.25)
(.625) (.375) 1.0
Figure 2
so that Structure is given as
I
:I
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S = H(.75, .25)+H(.675, .375)- H(.46, .29, .165, .085) = 0 2
It can also be shown that structure will be given by
S = H(x) - Hx ( y)
where H x(y) is the uncertainty of the conditional distribution of
y given x. Thus as structure increases, the uncertainty of y given
x falls since H(y) is assumed constant. Intuitively, once x is
known the uncertainty associated with y falls as understood inter-
dependence of the two variables approaches the true interdependence.
2To prove this for the general case note that,
S = 2 P(x) 4 P(x) + 2 P(y) og P(y) - 2 P(x,y) g P(x,y)
but in the case of complete ignorance
2 P(x,y) nq. P(x,y) = 2 Z P(x)P(y) ~g P(x)P(y)
x y
but this last right hand term can be written as
2 2 P(x)P(y) Qcg P(y) + 2 Z P(y)P(x) 4~ P(x)
xy xy
which in turn equals
Z P(x) 2 P(y) 4o P(y) + Z P(y) 2 P(x) Qg P(x)
x y y x
which yields
Z P(y) 4 P(y) + 2 P(x) 9o P(x)
so that structure is zero.
For all the basic definitions and properties of information functions
see, Gardner, op. cit., Chapters One and Two.
State
Probability
1 2 3 4
.5 .25 .125 .125
Figure 3
Now imagine that in any given decision making period, only one
of these four joint probability states actually "holds". That is in
any given period the variables x and y can be in only one of their
two states. Assume in addition that the firm's decision making
process requires that the firm determine which of the four states
actually holds. (Or, we can put it in predictive terms and say that
the firm must anticipate which of the four states will hold in the
coming period.) To do this, the firm engages in some form of sampling
(about which we will be more explicit in the coming section) and
then makes an "educated" guess.
We can then record its guesses over some period of time, and
then construct an "input-output" transmission table. The input
represents the number of times each state actually held, and the out-
put, the number of times each field was guessed to hold. The series
of joint input and output states represents the distribution of the
The Concept of Transmission
Before we can rank the "productivity" of models of differing
structure, we must first develop a measure of model performance.
Information theory provides a convenient measure in the con-
cept of "transmission" over a channel.
Let us label the four states of Fig. 1 in the following way:
input, or the actual occurrences, over the output, or the guesses.
Thus the "source" is the field, the channel is the sampling process,
and the output is the guess. Figure 4 presents such an input output
table for the field represented in Figs. 1 and 3.
Output 1 2 3 4
Input 1 4
2 1 1
3 1
4 1
Figure 4
Reading the table we see that out of eight "occurrences",
state 1 occurred with a probability of .5 and was correctly identi-
fied each time. State 2 occurred with a probability of .75 but was
correctly identified only 1 of the time. 3
Now transmission is defined as the amount of "structure between
the input and output. Thus, if we let T be transmission, I the input
and 0 the output we have,
T = H(I) + H(O) - H(I,O)
In our case this yields
T = 1.75 + 1.5 - 2.0 = .25 bits.
3Note we assumed that with a sufficient number of periods the states
occur in proportion to their true probabilities. Thus state one oc-
curred .5 of the time, state two .25 of the time, etc.
I
Note that when transmission is "perfect", i.e., each state is cor-
rectly anticipated, or identified, then we have
H(I) = H(O) = H(I,O)
so that
T = H(I) 4
Now we can imagine that if the firm spent more money in its
sampling process, its guesses would be better and the amount of
transmission "through" the transmission process would increase.
Completely error free transmission would result in an output of
1.85 bits. Presumably this would cost an infinite amount per sample,
thus perfect transmission could be approached only asymptotically.
This concept is presented by the following graph:
1.75
Bits
Figure 5
4Note that the definition of transmission does not distiinguish between
more severe and less severe mistakes. It is for this reason thLaL it
has been critical as a measure of performance. We implicitly assume
throughout that all errors are equally serious.
m
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Now we can express our intuitive concept of the relationship
between structure and channel capacity in the following way. Given
a fixed dollar per sample expenditure, a model of greater structure
should result in a greater amount of transmission. That is, we feel
that a greater understanding of the interrelationship between x and
y should result in a more "efficient" sampling process that takes
advantage of this increased understanding. Thus in Fig. 6 we have:
1.75
Bits
Dollar/Sample
Figure 6
Model one possesses a structure S1 greater than S2. 5
However, we later show that a better representation of this
concept is developed in Fig. 7.
5Note that there can be such a thing as too much structure, i.e.,
attributing too much interdepednence to the variables then t|here
actually is. Let us assume that we include only values of strucLture
up to, and including, the true structure.
I
1Bits/Sample
.8
Sc:1
Dollar/Sample
Figure 7
On the Y axis we plot the number of bits per sample transmitted,
and on the X axis the cost per sample.6  The model of complete structure
approaches an asymptotic value of one bit per sample, while models of
lower structure approach lower asymptotes. (One bit per sample is the
maximum due to the "binary character of the sampling process.) If
we think of bits/sample as the analogue of channel capacity, normally
expressed as bits/time, our graph captures the notion that models of
6Intuitively we can see that bits/sample rather than bits is a better
measure of model performance. If enough money is spent, any model
will permit the transmission of the full 1.75 bits. As we shall see,
bits/sample is a measure of the efficiency of different models, and
each model has a "maximum efficiency". This maximum efficiency is the
analogue of Shannon's channel capacity measure.
i
Bits/Sample
.8
ii
1
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greater structure increase channel capacity. The transmission limit
of any model, expressed as its asymptotic bit/sample value, is over-
come by models of greater structure. It is this sense that greater
structure "amplifies" the sampling process by "building" channel
capacity. If we say that models of greater structure possess more
information capital, we can see that information capital increases
the productivity of the sampling process.
M
I
M§2. The Sampling Process, Rank Value and the Cost of Perfect
Information
We would like to develop in a more rigorous fashion the relation-
ship between sampling cost, bit per sample and the amount of structure.
In this section we present the sampling process as a "coding problem".
Imagine that a firm faces a problem analogous to that of Chapter
Two. There are four regions to which it sells products, and in any
given period one and only one region will order. 7 To produce the cor-
rect product, it must anticipate which of these regions is about to
order. The probability that any given region will order is given by
the distribution presented in §1, where each region corresponds to one
of the states.
Region A B C C
Probability .5 .25 .125 .125
Figure 8
We assume that the firm engages in sampling to make the best
guess as to the sources of the coming order. Its sampling process
will be of the Bayesian variety. Thus imagine that its sampling
process consisted of one sample only (an assumption to be modified
shortly). Each region has an a priori probability attached to it,
7We assume that one and only one region will order per period rather
than some combination of regions. In this way we can stay within
the simple confines of binary arithmetic. The problem is analogous
to the toss of a die. Only one face can come up in any given throw.
Note we implicitly rule out "cross-period" probabilities, that is,
the probability of region A is considered to be .5 irrespective of
events of previous periods.
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and on the basis of the sampling result obtained the likelihood
that this result could have been obtained is determined for each
region. Combining these likelihoods with the a priori probabilities
would yield the a posteriori probabilities. The region with the
highest a posteriori probability would be chosen.
Let us now assume that the firm knows the correct distribution
as shown in Fig. 1. On the basis of this distribution, what could
constitute the firm's most efficient sampling process? Clearly,
since A occurs half the time we would like to devise a sampling
process that was relatively inexpensive when in fact A occurred.
It would be foolish to have to spend the same amount to discover A
as to discover D, since D will occur with only one fourth the fre-
quency of A. Phrased in this way, the problem of the most efficient
sampling process, the process that minimizes sampling cost is the
"dual" of the coding problem over a binary channel. (A binary
channel is one that is either off or on, analogous to our assumption
that each region will or will not order each period.)
The Coding Problem in Brief
Imagine that we wish to send a series of four messages over a
binary channel where the messages occur with the following probabilities;
M1  M2  M3 M4
.5 .25 .125 .125
Figure 9
Since the channel will be either off or on, a code will con-
sist of an assignment of zeroes and ones (off and on) for each
message.
To find the most efficient code partition the set of messages
into two sets, each with the same cumulative probability. Thus
the first partition will be:
Message M, M2 M3 M4
Probability .5 .5
Figure 10
Then assign to one set the value zero and to the other the value
one. Continue by partitioning the next subset in a similar fashion
again assigning zeroes and ones. When the partitioning is complete
each message will be associated with a set of zeroes and ones.8
This coding process is best represented by a tree structure.
(See Fig. 11)
This code is most efficient in that the expected number of
zeroes and ones that will be sent is at a minimum. The expected
number can be derived by multiplying the code length of each message
by its probability. When the code is the most efficient possible,
8This is exactly analogous to the "find the name in the telephone
book" parlor game. The most efficient way to proceed is to di-
vide the book in half, ask which half it is in, divide that section
in half, ask again, etc. In this way you minimize the number of
guesses required to locate the name.
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Figure 11
this expected number will be equal to the uncertainty value of the
distribution, in this case 1.75.9
How can this tree structure be interpreted as a sampling process?
Let each node on the tree represent a single sample. Let the symbol
v mean "and/or". Then the first node represents a sample that en-
ables the firm to distinguish between region A and region BvCvD. The
second node will be a sample that distinguishes between B and CvD, the
third between C and D.
How in fact will the firm distinguish or choose a particular
branch at any given node?
9 Not all probability distributions can be so divided, in fact only
where the probabilities are negative powers of two can the field be so
exactly divided. In cases where this is not possible, we divided our
message set into subsets so as to come as close as possible to equi-
probable divisions. Coding theory shows that this may in fact 1iot be
the most optimum mode of division. Specifically, we can code Ior lol.h,er
sequences of messages (i.e., ratlher tlan just code for M1 and M:., codI
for Mi M ,, etc.). But this has no natural interpretat ion in Our  o- I tm.
It is equivalent to Ihaving the firm predict orders for more thanl
one period. We will simply ignore this problem, using only exact ly
divisible probability sets in our example.
I
I
Let us consider the first node. If the firm understands the
underlying market forces that shape the probability distribution,
it will be able to select an "indicator" that will distinguish ef-
ficiently between the possibility of A and the possibility of BvCvD.
If we let the value of the indicator be I, then the sampling process
will result in the following Bayesian calculations,
P(A/I) = P(A)P(I/A)/P(I)
and
P(BvCvD/I) = P(BvCvD)P(I/BvCvD)/P(I)
The likelihoods, P(I/A), P(I/BvCvD), reflect the firm's under-
standing of the relationship between the indicator and the two possi-
ble events. An efficient indicator would result in divergent likeli-
hoods for the same event. The firms will choose that region whose a
posteriori probability is greatest.
Thus each node can be regarded as a sampling point, where a se-
lected indicator is sampled and used to distinguish between the two
branches on the node. Different tree structures will result in a dif-
ferent set of indicators, since the possible regions to be compared
at each node will be different. What will be the most efficient tree?
In our coding theorem the most efficient tree was one that minimized
the expected or average code length of the messages. But as is clear,
code length is equivalent to the number of samples required to dleter-
mine if a given region will be ordering next period. I'I'ilis the A ~lli c lent~
1
·1
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tree structure would be one that minimized the expected number of
samples and will be given by the binary division process described
above.
Assuming that the firm uses the most "efficient" tree structure
what will be the cost of "perfect" information? Let us assume that
the indicators at the different nodes are equally "reliable", e.g.,
they have the same variance. Then let S be the amount in dollars
per sample required for "perfect" (or as perfect as possible) infor-
mation. Then the expected cost of perfect information will be given
by S X H where H is the uncertainty of the distribution itself.
We can get a clearer idea of the meaning of an efficient structure
by asking, what would the firm's tree structure look like if it had
an incorrect conception of the relevant distribution?
Thus imagine that it posits the following model:
Region A B C D
Probability .125 .125 .25 .5
Figure 12
while the true model is still
Region A B C D
Probability .5 .25 .125 .5
Figure 13
If the firm follows the binary porcess described above it will
construct the following tree:
If the firm follows the binary porcess described above it will
construct the following tree:
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Figure 14
What will the cost of perfect information be to the firm? We
simply multiply the number of samples required to reach each region
by its probability of occurrence, times the cost per sample of error
free information, S. So we have,
1 x () + 2 () + 3 () + 3 () = 2.62 x S
while for the "correct" tree structure we would have
1 X (Q) + 2 x (Q) + 3 x (1) + 3 x () = 1.75 X S
This can be generalized in the following way. The cost of perfect
information for model j, call it PIj, will be given as
PI = -S p. 2 Pjj 1
where pi is the actual or true occurrence of the region and p. is
its supposed occurrence in the model j. (A little countirng will slhow
that- o 2 p is the number of nodes required to reach a region ii i th
tree structure generated by model j.) In the case of the correct
model this collapses to
TWO"-
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-S T Pi ý9 Pi = H(pl...Pn) lo
This calculation is presented for three different models.
Region Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 True Model
A .25 .25 .125 .5
B .5 .125 .125 .25
C .125 .5 .25 .125
D .125 .125 .5 .125
Expected
Cost S(2.00) S(2.37) S(2.62) S(1.25)
Figure 15
We can now define an "information distance" between any model
and the "true" representation as,
-_ pi.o Pj -(-E pi 4 Pi) =C Pi(b Pi - g pj) 11
Note that since each model implies a given tree structure which
in turn generates a set of indicators that compare events "pairwise",
loNote that we have implicitly assumed that the cost per sample required
for error free information per sample is the same for different models.
We might argue that "more incorrect" models should also generate less
efficient or less reliable indicators. This is possible. To the ex-
tent that this is true any cost differences we generate with respect
to perfect information for different models must be regarded as mini-
mum differences. We will continue to assume that S is the same for
all models. This point will be discussed when we discuss transmission
with error.
11Note that this can in turn be written as Zpi~o (Pi/Pj) which is strictly
analogous to the measure of the additional information obtained between
the a priori and a posteriori probabilities, i.e., the information
gained in any sampling process in general. Our measure can thus be
regarded as a measure of the additional information gained by having
a correct model. Strictly speaking this information distance measure
will hold only for the cases of exact binary division. In other cases
420 pj will not correspond precisely to the number of nodes required to
reach the region. But to the extent that 2a2Pj can be used as a
measure of the amount of information in an event with probability pi
(and this is not strictly kosher since only sets have information
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we can think of more efficient or better modelling as one that
selects the better subset of the large set of pairwise relation-
ships that exist between relationships. (Thus the tree structure
generated by models one, two, and three on the previous page, is
depicted in Fig. 14. It permits twelve possible pairwise comparisons
between sets of regions. Each model selects only a subset of four.)
In other words, we can use many different concepts (indicators)
to partition a conceptual field, there are many ways of looking at
a problem, but there will be one subset of concepts, associated with
the most efficient sampling process, which like Occam's razor permits
of the most economical understanding.1 2
Let us now call the expected number of samples for any model
its "rank value". Thus the rank value of model one in Fig. 15 is
2.00.
We can now interpret more fully the sources of "efficiency" of
the models with lower rank values. Thus let us consider the tree
structure of model three in Fig. 15.
The probabilities written along side the "branches" of the tree
are the true relative frequencies of the subsections being compared
at a given sampling node. The probabilities written at the end points
are the true probabilities of the regions at these points.
'
2The concept of an efficient tree structure for a model is exactly
analogous to the concept of an efficient tree structure for an or-
ganization. In both cases the efficiency is a function of the way
in which information is organized. In the model certain concepts --
indicators -- are developed, while others are suppressed. In the
organization certain interactions are recognized while others are
ignored.
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Figure 16
Now we know that the maximum bit value of any binary choice
is one, and is given where the two choices are equiprobable, i.e.,
H(.5, .5) = 1. Thus the bit value of each sampling choice of the
tree of model three will be less than one. In other words, an in-
correct model does not make the "most" out of a binary choice. It
loses bits per sample at each node.
Can we calculate the average or expected bit loss? First take
the bit value at each node and subtract it from to get the bit loss
at each node.
Sampling Node (.125, .875) (.142, .857) (.333, .667)
Bits Loss .4566 .4081 .0822
Figure 17
_-; _:~im
--
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The bit loss in the determination of any region will be the sum
of the bit losses over the nodes that must be "passed" to reach that
region. The expected bit loss will then be the weighted average over
the regions. Thus,
Expected Bit Loss
(.4566)(.125) + (.4566 + .4081)(.125) + (.4566 + .4081 + .0822)(.75)
which equals .87.
But note that, not surprisingly,
2.62 - 1.75 = .87
where 2.62 is the rank value of model three and 1.75 the rank value
of the true model.
Thus the information distance between a model and its true re-
presentation is equal to the expected bit loss of the model. Because
the incorrect model does not maximally exploit the binary choice, it
must spend that much more to get the correct information.
There is another fruitful way with which to interpret this bit
loss concept. Consider any pairwise comparison of a posteriori pro-
babilities at one of the sampling nodes, and let the log of the ratio
of the two probabilities be the measure of their divergence.
Thus let R and R' be the two sets of regions under consideration
at a given sampling node, and let I be the value of the indicator.
Then the divergence of the two a posteriori probabilities will be
given as
1A
mI
Ilog (P(R/I)) -i~og(P(R'/I))
but
ilag P(R/I) ilag P(R) +12og P(I/R) -i2og P(I)
and the same will be true for~o~ P(R'/I).
Now when the correct or true model is used, and the tree is
most efficient, the probabilities of the two branches at the given
nodes are equal. (Each is equal to .5.) Thus P(R) P(R') and the
measure of the divergence of the a posteriori probabilities becomes,
Ilog P(I/R) -12~g P(I/R')
or simply the differences in the likelihood, the prior probabilities
are eliminated. In effect, with correct binary division, we eliminate
our a priori biases in the determination of the correct region. We
rely solely on the likelihoods derived from the sampling information
itself. We let our sampling information "do all the work", thus
getting the maximum out of the sampling information.
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2g (P(R/I)/P(R'/I))
which can be written as
bg P(R/I)) - 4 (P(R'/I))
ut
g (R/I) =• (R) o4 (I/R) -• (I)
and the same will be true for o P(R'/I).
ow hen he orrect r rue model is used, and the tree is
most efficient, the probabilities of the two branches at the given
nodes are equal. (Each is equal to .5.) Thus P(R) = P(R') and the
measure of the divergence of the a osteriori robabilities ecomes,
S (I/R) -g (I/R')
or simply the differences in the likelihood, the prior probabilities
are eliminated. In effect, with correct binary division, we eliminate
ur  r ori iases n he termination f he orrect egion. 
ely olely on the likelihoods derived from the sampling information
itself. We let our sampling information "do all the work", thus
getting the maximum out of the sampling information.
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§3. Transmission with Error
Thus far we have considered the performance of different models
with respect to the cost of perfect information only. How will the
different models perform when we assume some rate of error in the
sampling process? Let us once again write down the different models
and their rank values.
Regi
Model
tru
on A
1 .25 .5
2 .25 .125
3 .125 .25
4 .125 .125
e .5 .25
.125
.5
.125
.25
.125
.125
.125
.5
.5
.25
Rank
Value
2.00
2.37
2.50
2.62
1.75
Figure 17
Now for every model
the sampling process.
the following tree structure is used in
(I)
(2')
(3) (i-t)
Figure 18
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The numbers identify the different "branches" of the tree.
When the model is specified the regions are distributed along
the tree by the rule of binary division.
Now turn to the tree structure of the true model and let the
probability of making an error be P. Thus for example, if the
region A is in fact about to order, then at the first node the pro-
bability that the firm will not choose the left branch of the first
node, region A but rather the right branch will be P. However, once
it has made the mistake and goes on to lower nodes, we assume that
there is a .5 chance that it will choose either branch of these lower
nodes (that is, once it has already made an error, the probability
that it will choose one false alternative over another is .5). Note
that the lower P, the higher will be the dollars per sample spent,
where each node represents one sample. Error or P will vary between
0 or perfect information, and .5 or completely random information.
Now we can construct an "input-output" table that gives the
probability that a specified input, or region, will yield a specified
output or guess. This is shown in Fig. 19.13
Branch 1 2 3 4
1 I-p .5p .2 5p .25p
2 p (1-p)2  .5(1-p)p .5 (1-p)p
3 p p(l-p) (1-p) 3  p(1-p) 2
4 p p(l-p) p(1-p)2  (1-p)3
Figure 19
'Note the distinction between this input output table and the one
developed in Chapter Two, §2. There, because we assumed nothing
about the firm's model of the field we could let error be distri-
buted evenly over all guesses. Here because we assume a model,
the error is distributed over the guesses in a structured way.
II
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Thus, for example, the probability that the region on branch
two will be mistaken for the region on branch one is p. Similarly,
the probability that the region on branch two will be correctly
identified will be (1-p)2 .
Thus to specify the input-output table for model one in Fig. 17,
we multiply each row by the true probability of the region placed at
the respective branch (as determined by model one). For example, for
model one region B will be placed on the left-hand branch of the first
node. Region B occurs with a true probability of .25. So the
"weighted" probability of correctly identifying B when it in fact
occurs will be .25(1-p). If p = .20, then .25(1-p) = .20.
We present the input-output table for model one p = .2.
1 2 3 4
1 .2 .025 .0125 .0125
2 .1 .32 .04 .04
3 .025 .02 .016 .064
4 .025 .02 .064 .016
Sum .350 .385 .1325 .1325
Figure 20
The sums over the columns represent the distribution over the
output or guesses. Thus, the probability that in any sampling pro-
cess the guess will be the region on branch one, in this case region
B will be .35; or .35 of the time the firm will guess region B.
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Now we can calculate the amount of transmission for model two
with p = .2.
We have the input uncertainty, 1.75 bits, we can calculate the
output uncertainty over the column sums, and we can calculate the
joint uncertainty from the entries in the input-output matrix itself.
Thus for this case we have
T = H(I) + H(0) - H(I,0)
.409 = 1.75 + 1.833 -3.174
In other words the "expected" amount of transmission for the
model will be .409 bits.
However, our analysis is not complete. The transmission of
the expected number of bits requires a certain number of samples,
and since each sample costs a certain amount, the more samples re-
quired to achieve a given level of transmission, the less efficient
the model. So we like to know not the "expected transmission" but
rather the "expected transmission per sample".
To calculate the expected number of samples, simply multiply
the frequency of the output states, or guesses, as given in the
column sums, by the number of samples required to reach that state
or region. Thus it takes only one sample to reach region B on the
tree of model one.
In our case the expected number of samples comes to 1.92. Thus
we can say that model two sill transmit .409 bits using on the average
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1.92 samples for an efficiency of .409/1.92 or .212 bits/sample.
This last number is thus a measure of the efficiency of model one
with p = .2.
The next table presents similar calculations for the four
models and "true" representation -- here called model zero, for
error, p = .2, .25, .33.
As can be seen from the last column, model efficiency falls
as we go from models of low rank value to models of high rank value,
and as we go to higher levels of error. In other words, the greater
the information distance between a model and its "true representation"
the less efficient it is at some specified level of error.
We graph these results on the next page. For a given p we
arbitrarily choose some level of dollars per sample, assuming that
"perfect" information is approached only asymptotically.1 4
14Note that this continues the assumption expressed in footnote 10
of this chapter. In other words the same dollar per sample gener-
ates the same error level for different models. To the extent
that this is not true the above table will represent minimum dif-
ferences in efficiency. This suggests an interesting way of
distinguishing between modes of improving knowledge. Thus let us
assume the higher the rank value of a model, the less divergent
the a posteriori probabilities (i.e., its indicators are not as
efficient) and thus the greater the chance that sampling variance
will result in wrong choices. Thus the difference between the
efficiency of the model and the true representation will be greater
than that given in Fig. 20. Thus the firm can improve model ef-
ficiency by improving the indicators so that the difference approaches
its minimum value. Further improvements require a change in the model
itself. Now improving the indicators, so as to get more divergent
a posteriori probabilities means getting a better understanding of the
"field". However, as its understanding of the field increases suf-
ficiently it should begin to develop a new and better model, i.e., one
with lower rank value. Thus improvements in indicators, within the
framework of a given model, is analogous to increases in quantitative
knowledge, while changes in the model itself, in the structure of the
model itself, is analogous to qualitative knowledge. Sufficient in-
creases in quantitative knowledge, i.e., improvements in the indicators,
should lead to increases in qualitative knowledge, i.e., an improvement
in the structure of the knowledge. Increases in qtiantitat ive knowvledge
only can increase model efficiency to tlie minimum dicl Ilerence betweeni it -
self and the true model.
I
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p = .2
Transmission
.435
.409
.392
.370
.353
Sample
1.75
1.92
2.09
2.18
2.24
Transmission/
Sample
.248
.212
.187
.170
.157
p = .25
.294
.268
.252
.235
.220
1.75
.189
2.04
2.10
2.15
.168
.141
.124
.112
.102
p = .33
.120
.109
.009
.008
1.75
1.85
1.93
1.98
2.00
.068
.059
.054
.045
.040
Figure 20
Model
0
1
2
3
4
RV
1.75
2.00
2.37
2.50
2.62
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Now what will be the asymptotic value by each curve? Clearly,
it must be the maximum number of transmitted bits divided by the
number of samples required to reach that number, or 1.75/Rank Value.
Ore more generally, for a field given of information value H, the
maximum productivity of this model will be given by H/RV.
This is clearly the analogue of Shannon's channel capacity,
which is an expression of the maximum transmission rate of a channel.
The analogue of "rate" in our example is 'ample"(which, as we shall
see, translates into cost).
We list the channel capacities of the different models in Fig.
21.
Model True 1 2 3 4
Chan. Cap. 1 .87 .74 .70 .66
Figure 21
In other words, the lower the rank value, the closer the model
is to the "truth" the greater the channel capacity. Getting "better"
models is equivalent to building "channel capacity".
Now our graph suggests, but does not prove, that models with
lower rank values will be everywhere more efficient than models
with higher rank values, i.e., at no point do these curves cross.
We can partially confirm this last proposition by calculating the
transmission for the following model:
Region
Probability
A B
.25 .25
Figure 22
The following tree structure is used to generate the intput-output
matrix.
Proceeding as before, we find the transmission rates for the
different errors.
Error
Rate
Rank Value
.20
.208
2.00
.25
.133
.33
.057
Figure 24
Note that the rank value of this model is the same as that of
model one. Thus this model and model one approach the same asymptotic
value of transmission per sample. However, error has a greater effect
I
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.25 .25
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on this model, thus it lies everywhere below model one and every
where above model two. In other words, the ranking of models by
transmission rates at one level of error is unchanged when we move
to a different level of error. This is consistent with our in-
tuition that at no points should the curves cross.
0
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§4. Structure and Rank Value
We are now in a position to begin to relate our concepts of
transmission and structure to the material developed in the last
section.
When structure is zero, then H(x) + H(y) - H(x,y) = O, or
H(x) + H(y) = H(x,y). Since structure cannot be less than zero
(simply a special case of the fact that transmission is non-negative),
the model of zero structure is the model where the joint uncertainty
is at a maximum.
Now we can prove the following theorem:
"The rank value of the model of zero structure is
equal to its joints uncertainty."
If we imagine that the true model is given by a matrix of di-
mension (I,J) where y takes on J states, for a given x, and x takes
on I states for a given y, and if we let ahk be the probability of
the (h,k) state, then the probability of the (h,k) states of the
model of zero structure will be given by:
I J
hk = ahk k ahk
h=1 k=1
The rank value of this model will be given as
I J I J I J
E Z ahk ahk or • ahk o a a
h=1 k=1k ik j
or
I J I I J J
D ahk0 • a ik + E ajahkD 2 ahj
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But since the order of summation is irrelevant
J I I I J J
ZZ ahk oF aik +F F ahkoC4E ahj
Now the first term in this expression is the uncertainty of the
marginal distribution over the columns or H(y), and the second is the
marginal distribution over the rows or H(x). But we know that for
the model of zero structure H(x) + H(y) = H(x,y), and since Rank Value
H(x) + H(y), the rank value of the model of zero structure is equal to
its joint uncertainty.
Now for the model of complete structure rank value will also be
equal to the joint uncertainty of the true model itself. But since
we are confining our attention to the class of models where the mar-
ginal probabilities are constant, this means that the rank value of
the model of complete structure is less than the rank value of the
model of zero structure. In other words, if we let RV' be the rank
value of the model of zero structure, and RV the rank value of the
model of complete structure we have
RV' = H(x) + H(y)
but
H(x) + H(y) > H(x,y)
but
H(x,y) = RV
so
RV' > RV
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This suggests that as we go from a model of zero structure to a
model of complete structure, rank value valls, and as we saw in the
last section, models of lower rank value have higher channel capacities.
This is partial justification for our original intuition that increases
in structure lead to more efficient models.
Nevertheless this is incomplete, since we would have to prove
that increases in structure are monotonically associated with decreases
in rank value. We know that over a certain range of models this will
not be true. As we move through models possessing more than the true
amount of structure, rank value will increase, i.e., attributing more
interdependence to the variables than there actually is, is just as
bad as not attributing enough. (It is in this sense that rank value
is a much better measure than structure as a general index of "truth".
Our intuitive "picture" of the relationship between structure
and rank value thus looks like Fig. 25.
Rank
Value 7/
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structure, rank value is at a minimum. (This follows from the basic
coding theorem, i.e., correct binary division results in the more ef-
ficient code). Also, we have been able to derive the rank value of
point A, the point of zero structure. Clearly our discussion in
Part One referred only to models between points A and B. Thus we
must prove monotonicity between these two points. Unfortunately, we
have not been able to complete this proof, and present only a partial
development here.l4
Since we are considering the class of models where the marginals
are preserved, any change in structure is a result of a change in
joint uncertainty. Now since structure varies inversely with joint
uncertainty, we want to prove that rank value varies directly with
joint uncertainty reaching a maximum at the point of zero structure
or maximum joint uncertainty. Now the joint uncertainty of any model
between A and B can be written as
- C (Pi+ ei) ~O~ (Pi+ ei)
where the P's represent the true probabilities and the e's the additions
or subtractions to these probability values, to arrive at the specified
model. Now this expression can in turn be written as
- C P II~ (P f e) - C e I2ag (P+ e)
1"Rigorously speaking, structure is unidimensional in the two variable
case. only. That is only in this case will there be j~lst: Lwo nroJi~ls
that correspond to a given ranle value, one tl~at ovc~rstalc~s anti II~~~
otli~lr that understates thr· amcllllt Or struCt~~re ill LJic' 111()(1(II
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We know that at point B, the point of complete or actual
structure, rank value is at a minimum. (This follows from the basic
coding theorem, i.e., correct binary division results in the more ef-
ficient code). Also, we have been able to derive the rank value of
point A, the point of zero structure. Clearly our discussion in
art ne ferred nly to odels etween oints  and . hus e
must prove monotonicity between these two points. Unfortunately, we
ave not en able to complete this proof, and present only a partial
evelopment here.14
ince e re onsidering he lass f odels h re the marginals
are preserved, any change in structure is a result of a change in
joint uncertainty. Now since structure varies inversely with joint
uncertainty, we want to prove that rank value varies directly with
joint uncertainty reaching a maximum at the point of zero structure
or maximum joint uncertainty. Now the joint uncertainty of any model
etween nd  an e ritten s
- E (Pi + e i ) . (Pi + e i )
where the P's represent the true probabilities and the e's the additions
or subtractions to these probability values, to arrive at the specified
model. Now this expression can in turn be written as
- Z PQ4o (P + e) - E e 4g (P+ e)
4Rigorously speaking, structure is unidimensional in the two variable
ase nly. hat is nly in this case ill there be juist two models
that correspond to a given rank value, one that overstates antid he
ther hat nderstates he ount of tructture illn t1w m••1o l.
i) i)
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But the left-hand part of this expression is the rank value. So if
we let Hm(x,y) be the joint uncertainty of model m, we have
RVm = Hm(x,y) + E eQ (P+e)
so that
dRV/dH(x,y) = 1 - d(- Z e4~ (P+ e))/dH(x,y)
so that the latter term must be less than one between the points
A and B if the graph of Fig. 25 is to be monotonic. I have not been
able to prove this.1 5 Note that this expression cannot be greater
than one everywhere, since that would imply dRV/dH(x,y) < 0 every-
1 5Note that we know that at both points A and B -Ee?. (P+ e) is
zero; at point A because the additions and subtractions cancel
each other out, and at point B because all the e's are zero. Thus,
by Rolles theorem this expression reaches a maximum or minimum
between points A and B. Call that point M. Then we would expect
this expression to rise between points A and M, thus lowering RV,
to fall between M and B but not as fast as the fall in H(x,y),
thus slowing down the decline in RV. Finally, the decline in this
expression brings RV to its minimum. Beyond B this expression
falls more quickly than H(x,y), and very likely turns negative
at point B. This intution is expressed in the following graph.
Ki
__
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where, which is impossible since we have already located the two
points A and B. So if there were a region where this expression
were greater than one the derivative of the curve of Fig. 25 would
have to change sign at least once, which intuitively seems im-
plausible.
Let us summarize. We have seen that models can be ranked in
information distance from the true model, and we saw that this ranking
generates an efficiency of transmission measure such that models closer to
the truth are more efficient. In addition, we tried to argue that the
concept of structure can be related to our general measure of infor-
mation distance such that models of greater structure are more ef-
ficient. However, as is clear, our model is not complete, specifically:
a) We did not analytically derive the relationship between
transmission and rank value. Our graph was suggestive but not a
precise proof.
b) We have not succeeded in determining the relationship
between structure and rank value. We determined the relationship
for two extreme values only.
c) We have employed discontinuous distribution only where
exact binary division was possible.
In other words the "structure" of our model can be thought of
as developing the following three links.
Strucure E ror
Rank Value - > Transmission
Figure 26
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However the links are only partial. I suspect that the use of
continuous distributions would complete these links and permit ana-
lytic proofs of our suggested propositions.
We can now easily establish the relationship between transmission
rates, channel capacity and average cost. Thus we return to Fig. 21
which is reproduced in its essentials here.
Bits/
Sample
Dollars/Sample
Figure 27
Take the ray from the origin to the graph. Its slope will be
given as,
(Bits/Sample)(Sample/Dollar) = Bits/Dollar.
Since the slope of the ray falls as dollars/sample increases that
means that bits/dollar falls or dollars/bit, the average cost of a
bit rises. Thus, to approach the channel capacity of a model re-
quires an increasing expenditure per bit of information. (This flows
pr·-~
from the assumption that perfect information can be approached only
asymptotically.)
However, as is clear as the amount of information capital in-
creases, i.e., as the amount of structure rises, the average cost of
information falls for any specified level of dollar expenditure per
sample. In other words, Fig. 27 translates into
Dollars/
Bit
S2J
Dollars/Sample
Figure 28
where the lower cost curves are associated with more information
capital. In other words, increasing information capital raises
channel capacity and lowers the average cost of information.
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Summary
We have sought to give greater rigor to our original intuition that
models that reveal more of the implicit patterns in the data, that expose
their inherent complexity are more productive than "naive" models that do
not capture this complexity. We then measured complexity with the infor-
mation measure of the amount of structure between two variables. In turn,
the amount of structure can be thought of as a measure of the amount of
information capital in the model. The term "capital" is appropriate here
since structure represents "congealed" information that determines the cost
of processing information "flows". We saw that mathematically the measure
of structure is a measure of the transmission between two variables. Thus,
information capital represents congealed transmission that reduces the cost
of flow transmission. Transmission within the model substitutes for trans-
mission through the model. We found that we could measure the maximum
productivity of models with a term analogous to Shannon's channel capacity.
A model's channel capacity was given by the maximum bits per sampling
dollar it could produce. This maximum was equal to H/RV, where H was the
uncertainty of the field and RV was the rank value of the model. We saw
that a given transmission rate curve was in turn associated with an
average cost curve of information, and that to reach the point of channel
capacity of a given model required an increasing expenditure per bit of
information. However, we saw that increasing the amount of information
capital lowered the average cost of information for any specified level
of error. Thus building channel capacity was equivalent to lowering the
average cost of information, a result consistent witlh our llotiglhts ill
Chapter Two.
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We can assume that to build models of greater structure requires
an investment of money for research and that the greater the amount
of structure the greater the investment costs. If we term sampling
costs as the cost of "information labor", then our results are suc-
cinctly stated as:
"An increase in the ratio of information capital
to information labor, increases the productivity
of information labor , and lowers the average cost
of information.''
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§5. Some Special Properties of Information Capital
Information capital does not share all the properties of physical
capital. Its rate of depreciation or obsolescence, is not a function
of its utilization but is rather a function of the rate of change in
the field itself. Thus, if the model of the field is correct, its
channel capacity will be one bit per sample. But as the field changes
its rank value will rise and its channel capacity will fall. 1 5
We can in fact argue that information capital is replenished
rather than depreciated by use. Knowledge not used is soon forgotten.
This is simply a special case for the general proposition that structure--
organizational or informational--is replenished by use. Role differ-
entiation is legitimized in the daily acts of role fulfillment. When
roles are no longer followed, the role structure breaks down.
Unlike physical capital there are no fixed cost differentials
associated with different amounts of information capital. We often
associate a high fixed cost with a highly capital intensive production
15We can hypothesize that the rate of depreciation of information capital
is a function of the stock of information capital in society. This
follows from the notion that as the amount of information capital in-
creases, the response time to new innovations and opportunities de-
creases, the horizon of the organizational unit widens, and as a con-
sequence the environment becomes both more complex, and less stable.
Thus, as the amount of information capital grows, the rate of change
of the "field" and its complexity increases. Thus any given model
has a shorter useful life as its channel capacity falls more quickly.
Thus firms cannot for long rely on a given model but must anticipate
new models, new configurations. Paradoxically, while information
capital can reduce the level of risk for a given organizational
unit with respect to a given field, the "composition" effect results
in an over-all increase in uncertainty. In other words, it is a
"fallacy of composition" to believe that over-all risk is reduced
with the growth in society's stock of information capital.
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process, attributing the high overhead to maintenance and the like.
(The term fixed cost should not obscure the fact that overhead costs
are flow costs, as opposed to investments which are one shot affairs.)
Maintenance cost, however, are simply a variant of depreciation costs,
and as we have already argued depreciation of information capital is
independent of its use.1 6
The difference between the initial investment cost and reproduc-
tion cost is greater for information capital than the corresponding
difference for physical capital.
There are always cost differences between the first addition of
a new form of physical capital to the capital stock, and subsequent
additions, due to presence of bugs, and gaps of knowledge. As these
are overcome, reproduction cost, the cost of subsequent addition falls
toward the resource costs of the new capital. Thus as the proportion
of information investment costs to total investment costs rises, the
greater will be the difference between the initial investment costs
and the reproduction cost. Since information capital is "pure" infor-
mation, this difference will be greatest with respect to information
capital.
Finally, as many have pointed out, the consumption of information
is not a zero sum process. A "bit" of information can be consumed many
times without "disappearing". However, the private utility of information
16Not coincidentally, this is the analogue of the "theorem" stated in the
appendix to Chapter Two, where we said that there are no fixed cost
differentials to different organizational structures, so t hat t lIe cost
curve of one organizational structure lies everywhere Ibe low t l•e cost
curve of another.
-- 
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depends on its distribution. The ability to profit from a piece of
information is a function of who else does not have access to it.
The consequence of these particular properties of information,
and information capital, is that information is very diffifult to
"privatize". There is an inherent "publicness" to information. De-
preciation through use, high fixed costs, high reproduction costs, and
zero sum consumption, are all scarcity limits to the full and equitable
distribution of physical capital. All economic systems must devise a
mode of distribution for physical capital, but these natural scarcity
characteristics of physical capital tend to support any particular sys-
tem of unequitable distribution. The distribution of information
capital, however, is not constrained by these limits.
However, we know that the private utility of information is a
direct function of its maldistribution. Similarly, as we saw in chapter
two, full access to the firm's information capital would imply more demo-
cratic decision making. Thus, at the same time that the private appro-
priation of information capital becomes necessary for private gain and
power, so does the natural characteristics of information push in the
direction of a full and democratic access to information capital. This
is perhaps in its "purest" form an example of Marx s contradiction between
the social nature of production and its private appropriation.
Equally important, the maldistribution of information capital
limits its productivity. Information disseminated widely can lead to
'
6Not coincidentally, this is the analogue of the "theorem" stated in
the appendix to Chapter Two, where we said that there are no fixed
cost differentials to different organizational structures, so that
the cost curve of one organizational structure lies everywhere below
the cost curve of another.
3 --
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to more information, more insights, a greater number of"new combi-
nations" than if its dissemination were restricted. Thus as in Marx,
private forms of appropriate are fetters on the development and grow-
ing productivity of information capital. We can thus expect the con-
flicts around the appropriation of information capital to be parti-
cularly severe.
INFORMATION CAPITAL
from the Perspective of Conflict
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Chapter Four
ON GROWTH AND CONFLICT
§1. It is perhaps one of the unwritten assumptions of economic
theory, that growth can ameliorate economic conflict. The distri-
bution of income is a critical parameter only when resources are
fixed. Conflict will then be strictly "zero sum" and for every
loser there will be a gainer. Growth, however, so the argument goes,
is a "positive sum game" where, if the institutional rules are reason-
ably constructed, everybody is the winner. This proposition is
reasonable, however, only if one focuses on the growing income stream,
to the exclusion of the resultant distribution of capital. After all,
capital broadly defined, consists of an enforceable claim on this in-
come stream, whether it be in the form of the ownership of physical
capital, "tenure" arrangements, or access to certain decision making
processes. It is the economic correlate of "power" and "status"
the ability to insure a continuous stream of benefits through the
exercise of certain economically or socially sanctioned prerogatives.
Growth that entailed the redistribution of such prerogatives, the
destruction of old and the creation of new claims, would contain the
seeds of conflict. Economic theory, however, sheds little light on
these "capital effects" of economic growth.
Two of our more subtle economic historians, J.A. Schumpeter and
Karl Polanyi, saw "capital destruction" as an intimate part of tihe
-L 1
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process of economic growth. To Schumpeter, growth was a process
of "creative destruction".l The creation of new products, new pro-
cesses, and new forms of economic organization, meant the destruc-
tion of old "capital values" of old structures and organizations.
Growth meant the restructuring of old modes of production and con-
sumption, and the demise of those organizations that could not with-
stand the "gale of perrenial destruction". To Schumpeter this process
was the only meaningful form of economic "competition". The continuous
fluctuation of prices about their long term equilibrium values were
of only marginal significance to the competitive process. What really
counted were the technological changes, the product innovations, the
introduction of new organizing and coordinating principles, the tra-
ditionally "exogeneous factors" of neoclassical thinking.
Polanyi extended this concept of "destructive" growth.2 In his
analysis it lies at the heart of the strictly utopian idea of the
perfect and unregulated market. Unfettered mobility in the market
for "labor" (the fictitious name for man) and perfect markets for
"land" (the fictitious name for nature) could mean only the continuous
upheaval if not destruction of all forms of social community and
social status. The idea of the perfect market could mean only the
dissolution of society. It was the confrontation with this idea,
and its partial realization in the initial stages of industrialization
that in Polanyi' s view, gave rise throughout Europe to the spontaneous
demands for protection from the unregulated market.
7Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism Socialism and De~mocracy, Harpe~r
andc Row, New Yorkc, 1962.
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Curiously enough, Schumpeter also discovered an institutional
response to the "excessively" destructive winds of economic growth.
But unlike Polanyi he located it not in the political sphere, but
in the very "monopolistic" practices regarded as so inimical to com-
petition by the classicisits and neo-classicists. The various "re-
straints" on trade, the inflexibility of prices were ways of insur-
ing a degree of stability in the vortex of market fluctuations. The
demise of a firm meant the destruction of society's "organizational
capital". The productivity of the new had to be insured before the
old could be allowed to disappear. Restraints on trade were thus a
way of insuring both "orderly advances and retreats".3  In Schumpeter's
view they served to cushion the process of transition, and minimize
the costs of dislocation.
Thus, in the schemes of both these theorists, growth entailed
the destruction of old physical, organizational, and social capital.
The resistance to this destruction, to change and the rate of change,
could crystallize in political conflict. However, some analytical and
empirical reflection will show that not all growth can be classified
as "capital destroying". In fact, we can fruitfully distinguish
between three modes of growth, capital preserving, capital augmenting,
and capital destroying growth. In turn, this taxonomy will help us
analyze the impact of the emergence of Information Capital.
Capital preserving growth can be associated with a growth in the
scale of economic operations, with the composition of otiLp•tL andl the
'Joseph A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 90.
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structure of capital (both physical and organizational) constant.
It can be empirically associated with the initial stages of growth
of an economy or urban region, and resembles most closely the metaphor
of constant returns to scale that lies at the heart of such neo-
classical theory.
Capital augmenting growth is associated with the process of
structural differentiation, or the specialization of economic activity.
We call it capital augmenting because it creates new centers of
economic activity that are complementary rather than competitive with
the old. In the parlance, this is associated with "external economies",
as the addition of new activity lowers the cost curves of the old.
Urban economists have found this process of structural differentiation
to be central to the process of urban development.4 It is capital
augmenting because it creates new physical and organizational capital
while simultaneously raising the present value of the old.
Finally, capital destroying growth is associated with Schum-
peterian competition, in which new capital is competitive with the
old. In the process of raising over-all output and productivity,
such competition results in a redistribution of capital claims. In
addition, it can be fruitfully associated with the process of the
integration of economic activity, as backward and forward linkages
(i.e., suppliers and buyers) once coordinated through the market are
coordinated through the firm.
4Edgar Hoover and Raymond Vernon, The Anatomy of a Metropolis,
Doubleday and Co., New York, 1962.
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It should be clear now that the taxonomy developed here paral-
lels the taxonomy developed in our schema of organizational growth.
The process of structural differentiation corresponds to the process
of greater specialization of organizational activity. We saw that
in the "tree model" or organizational structure, an increase in the
degree of specialization with span fixed resulted in an increase in
the number of decision amking and processing nodes (i.e., dK/dN > 0).
As in structural differentiation within the economy, new loci of de-
cision making power, of organizational prerogatives, were created.
Similarly, the emergence of information capital as our "final
stage" of organizational growth corresponds with the process of
Schumpeterian competition. Both involve the destruction of capital.
As we saw earlier, the emergence of information capital could result
in either a centraliza~tion or decentraliz.ation of decision making
power. But in either case, it involved the restructuring of organ-
izational activity, and a redistribution of the "organizational
capital".
This parallelism between our two taxonomies lends to a more
basic insight, for there is a more fundamental symmetry between
Schumpdegree of sian pecialization andwi th span fixed resulted in an increase in
innovation entails the discovery and utilization of new information.
Whether it be a new product, or process, the entrepreneur must inte-
grate hitherto compartmentalized markets or materials. He must discover
patterns that transcend the given structure of production and consumption.
patterns that transcend the given structure of production and consumption.
3Clllllllt)t~Lt~L 1411 CVLLLt~t~LILIUIL cLLIIl IIILVLILLQLIVLI LaPILQL 3LIIUIILt~C;LCL Lall
innovation entails the discovery and utilization of new information.
Whether it be a new product, or process, the entrepreneur must inte-
grate hitherto compartmentalized markets or materials. He must discover
patterns that transcend the given structure of production and consumption.
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In effect, the entrepreneur embodies information capital. But of
course in the Schumpeterian scheme the "number" of entrepreneurs is
exogenously given. Schumpeter did not suggest that the ability to
imagine new economic patterns and organizational structures could
be technologically determined. But as we have already argued the
ability to comprehend new patterns and structure information on an
ever widening scale is in fact a function of the information pro-
cessing and modelling technologies. This suggests that as these
technologies improve the societal capacity for "entrepreneurial
activity" increases. But we suggests here that as these technologies
improve, the entrepreneurial capability, the ability to imagine new
economic and social structures (in a non-utopian and empirical fashion)
is no longer located strictly within the business - market sector.
Rather, it is found increasingly in the education, government, and
other sectors where the skill for appropriating information improves
along with the development of society's information technologies.
Thus an increasing proportion of the population lives within the
nexus of "future images". This accounts in part for the psychological
sensation of an increasing "rate of societal change", and the demands
for societal "restructuring". More importantly, where the "entre-
preneurial" capability does not coincide with financial or political
power, we can expect intensifying political conflicts over the rate
and direction of change. But we get ahead of our story. We want to
turn now to a more detailed analysis of the dynamics of conflict sur-
rounding the emergence of information capital. Once again we utilize
an organizational perspective to inform our analysis.
I
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§2. We have suggested that the defined set of prerogatives and tasks
of a unit within an organization constitutes its "package" of organ-
izational capital. The performance of such tasks and the exercise
of such prerogatives insured a continuous stream of benefits. The
unit's position within the organization defined the quality of its
organizational capital. What however "protects" the unit? What in-
sures that its claim to organizational output will be preserved? Its
claim is in part insured to the extent that it can exercise its "power"
within the organization. In turn such power rests on the fact that
it monopolizes certain organizational resources, because the organ-
ization is in fact based on a series of task specializations.
Structural differentiation means that tasks are performed by special-
ized units. Thus, for example, each unit will process some subset of
the organization's information flow that is inaccessible to the other
units. As a consequence, the tasks of one unit cannot substitute for
the tasks of another in the production of organizational output.
Specialization implies a range of "fixed coefficients" in the organ-
izational "production function". Power based in the structure of
organization derives in the end from the nature and degree of task
specializations.
We can show this relationship between power and "fixed coef-
ficients" through the use of the traditional isoquant diagram. In
Fig. 1 we let each axis represent the "amount" of input from each
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ization3 begin at output AB and now let A draw down its input to
pective of 3 h  cost of that output.)
la Ib
Figure 1
unit. The isoquants represent the amount of organizational output.
Figure la is the case of complete substitutability, while Fig. Ib
is the case of a high degree of specialization in A. Assume now
that the "goal" of unit B is to keep output at Q-. Let the organ-
ization begin at output A3BI, and now let A draw down its input to
A2, and then to Al. In Fig. la B can always respond to a reduction
in A's input so as to keep output at Q, (i.e., by moving first to W:,
and then to B3). Thus for each move of A, B has a response that keups
output at Qj. But in Fig. ib, A clearly controls the outcome. At
A2 output must fall to Q2 while at A1 output must fall to Qi. 5 B
has no responses to A's moves and thus A controls the outcome. (Note
that we have not been considering the implicit "costs" of response.
We assume that the goal is the maintenance of a level of output irres-
pective of the cost of that output.)
'W c re assImin no "inter-venin i " oit putis betwteen Q(, atld Q:,.
---
139
We can summarize this "game" in the following tabular form.
B1 B2 B3 B1 B2 B3
Q3  A3
< Q Q3 A2
< Q3 Q3 A,
I I
Q3
I I
Q2 Q2 Q2
I I
Q1 : Qi Qi
I I
* S
(a) (b)
Figure 2
As is clear from the tabular form, B controls the outcome in
the first case, while A controls it in the second. Note that in
there is no distinction between B2 and B3; they are equi-
valent to the same response. In other words, as the degree of sub-
stitutability falls, the "variety" of B's distinct responses falls.
This corresponds with the cybernetic notion of "control" or "regu-
lation". Ashby shows, in his Introduction to Cybernetics 6 , that the
number of possible outcomes in a "game" of move and counter move
will be greater than or equal to (Variety of A/Variety of B) where
the number of a unit's possible distinct moves is its variety. If
we measure this in log to the base two, we then get that the lower
limit of the information or uncertainty value of outcomes will be
given by 4 A'-4 B', where A' and B' are the variety of A and B,
respectively (i.e., the number of distinct responses). Thus, if A'
is fixed, the lower limit to the uncertainty of the outcome will be
A 3
A2
Al
6W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics, John Wiley & Sons,
New York, 1963, Chapter 11.
---
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determined by B. Thus we can say (though a more rigorous model
would have to be constructed to prove this statement) that the less
the degree of substitutability the greater the uncertainty of the
outcome, the less power does B have over A. This is the sense in
which specialization, the monopolization of organizational resources,
confers power on the organizational units.
This concept of a range of non-substitutability suggests that
there will be "threshold" effects in conflicts over the distribution
of income, i.e., there will be limits to A's and B's share of or-
ganizational income. We can demonstrate this concept by modifying
Herbert Simon's model of the "employment relation". 7
Let B be the employer, A the employee, and let the X axis repre-
sent A's "effort input" per unit of time. Assume the stock of physical
capital is constant. As effort input per unit of time (E/T) increases,
the organizational output rises. On the Y axis we place the wage rate
x + x' Q= f(E/T)
Figure 3
of A. Then we say that A has a minimal acceptance curve AA' and B
7Herbert Simon, Models of Man, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1957.
See "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relation"
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has a maximal offer curve BB'. The position of these curves will
be determined by some of the traditional market factors (i.e., mar-
ket scarcities) and by the relative power of A and B within the or-
ganization. Thus, for example, at any given level of output A will
determine what damage (as in a strike) he can inflict on B without
generating too great a cost to himself. Similarly B will calculate
how expensive the cost of buffering against actions by A will be.
Such calculations will generate the offer and acceptance curves.
Initially these curves will represent subjective evaluations of
power, but over time and with experience such curves will come to re-
present the objective correlates of relative power.8 As can be seen,
conflict over the distribution of income will take place within the
area bounded by the two curves. This zone of conflict is the analogue
of the uncertainty measure o A'- 0x B'. If B cannot control the out-
come then he cannot "dictate" the wage offer to A. Variety in the
set of outcomes means a zone of conflict over the distribution of
income.
Now let the organization begin at output X and at wage rate C,
and let output rise to X'. Since the condition of employment has
changed (i.e., E/T has risen), there will presumably be a new wage
level. But so long as the structure of the organization remains un-
changed, neither the acceptance nor offer curve will shift positions.
Thus even though the wage rate changes, the zone of conflict is stable.
HNote that in contrast to our previous model of power, we assume that
the goal of thle two units also includes the cost of sulstaining a
certai.n outcome.
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In short, conflicts over the distribution of income are stable
long as there is no threat to the structure of the organization,
to the distribution of organizational capital.
It should be clear now that the emergence of information capital
introduces a new level of conflict. It results not in a struggle
over output, but in a struggle over the claims to output, over the
zone of conflict itself. Struggle over the claims to output intro-
duces a new level of uncertainty to organizational conflict. As we
have just seen, a given conflict zone corresponds to the uncertainty
value with respect to the possible outcomes. But as we saw the emer-
gence of information capital entails a change in the structure of
organization and a redistribution of power. Thus in the course of
transition from the old to the new structure there are no bounds to
the conflict, there is no uncertainty value attached to the possible
set of outcomes. The organization finds itself operating in a region
of "meta-uncertainty". (This distinction precisely parallels Knight's
distinction between uncertainty and risk.) It is this new level of
uncertainty, the conflict over the zone of conflict, that distinguishes
conflict surrounding the emergence of information capital, from con-
flict over the distribution of income.
As a consequence, income per se is no longer a reliable guide
as to "enemies and allies". The emergence of information capital
can "twist" what might appear to be the "natural" set of alliances.
Thus when an information system restructures a medical service in a
-M
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hospital, administrators, lower level clerks, and senior doctors,
all stand to lose, while "para-professionals", young doctors, and
urban blacks (who will gain from better service) all stand to win.
Thus the redistribution of organizational capital, as opposed to
organizational income, generates new alliances. The emergence of
information capital means a "new politics".
The conflict surrounding the emergence of information capital
can be particularly severe because the generalized "uncertainty",
the absence of bounds to the conflict, renders strict material and
utilitarian considerations inoperative. Michael Rose, in his
Computers, Managers and Society, finds that fears of redundancy, un-
certainty with respect to job ladders and structures, and the
threatened loss in status brings a seemingly "irrational" dimension
to the problem of introducing computers into offices.9 The problem
becomes a political rather than a technical one. Rose notes:
It is worth noting that this fear of redundancy
is not simply that of the loss of a convenient
well paid or previously promising appointment,
nor the worry of finding another to replace it,
with the accompanying possibility of a period of
unemployment, the need to move house perhaps, and
other dislocations. The indignity of the severance
itself, its assault upon individual feelings of self
esteem, even sometimes of indispensability, is no
less repellant than these mundane practilities.
In a different context, Polanyi deals with this same "economistic
prejudice". He attacks economic historians for focusing simply on
income data in their estimation of the impact of the industrial
9Michael Rose, Computers, Managers and Society, Penguin Books,
Baltimore, 1969, p. 157.
143
I
144
revolution on the English peasant.
Actually, of course, a social calamity is primarily
cultural and not an economic phenomena that can be
measured by income figures, or economic statistics.
Not economic exploitation, as often assumed, but the
disintegration of the cultural environment of the
victim (English peasant) is then the cause of de-
gradation.lo
In short, information capital means the dissolution of old
structures. It is the consequent, threatened loss of power, fears
of redundancy, and generalized uncertainty that affects all who stand
to lose with "restructuring" that brings a new qualitative dimension
to organizational and, by inference, more general social conflict.
The emergence of information capital means that conflict no longer
centers around the distribution of income, but rather around the
distribution of organizational capital within a context of growth
and change.
1oKarl Polanyi, op. cit., p. 157.
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ADDENDUM
We have suggested that the conflict surrounding the transition
period can be particularly "severe". We can show this somewhat more
rigorously through the use of some simple game theoretic considerations.
Thus let A be the employee and B the employer. Assume that
B can decide to restructure or not restructure the organization.
A is aware of this possibility and can either toughen its stance,
i.e., bring its power to more fully bear on organizational operations,
or behave as in the past. Thus we say that A can engage in either
cooperative or non-cooperative behavior. Let us list in the squares
present value of the proportion of organizational output going to A
in the event of different combinations of behavior.
B
Restructure (R) No Restructure (NR)
Cooperative (C) .2 .3
A
(Non-Cooperative (NC) .4 .5
Square (C,NR) represent the present value of A's organizational
capital before any "innovation". Square (NC,NR) represent a
"tougher" stance on the part of B with the same organizational
capital (i.e., without any improvement). A can achieve the highest
share in the case of (NC,NR), since he exercises his power more
fully within the old structure; but he achieves the lower share at
(C,NR) where he cooperates in the loss of his organizational capital.
In other words, he can raise his share from .2 to .3 by not cooperating
0
146
with the restructuring process. In effect, he resists the innovation,
postpones the diminuition of his own power, and thus raise the pre-
sent value of his organizational capital.
Now, if A follows a maximin strategy, i.e., he looks for the
best of the worst, he will chooise point NC. If B pursues a minimax
strategy, i.e., he minimizes his loss under the worst conditions, he
will choose point R. The game will then settle down at (NC,R) or re-
structuring with non-cooperation, as opposed to (C,R) which would have
implied a less severe transition.
The numbers chosen here are, of course, somewhat arbitrary, but
the example does bring out the way in which under the impact of infor-
mation capital, there will be a tendency on the part of potential
lowers to "milk" the present organizational capital dry". (Our use
of the employer-employee analogy should not obscure the possibility
that the potential losers can be those who are presently in power.)
INFORMATION CAPITAL
from a Radical Perspective
1
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Chapter Five
§1. The Demise of the Market
"The demise of the market" figures centrally in J.K. Galbraith's
latest book, The New Industrial State.l  Drawing on Berle and Means'
classic, The Modern Corporation and Private Property , and somewhat
unconsciously, on Schumpeter and Polanyi, Galbraith finds that price
fluctuations no longer determine the allocation of resources. Market
forces take a back seat to corporate planning as price elasticity
drops precipitously to zero.
The economics profession was singularly unimpressed. Every-
where you look there are markets. After all commodity brokers match
supply and demand daily, list price is always shaded a bit by the
dealer when autors are moving slowly out of the show room, and "in the
long run" market price is a good measure of resource cost. In the
end "the demise of the market" seemed like too weighty a proposition
to depend on the stability or instability of a few key industrial
prices. But the concept persists with an underground life of its
own. Some of the more stubborn social critics cannot help but
imagine that since the Russian Revolution, The New Deal, the Keynesian
victory, the Marshall Plan, the rise of the multi-national corporation,
the growth in the public sector, etc., modern capitalism must differ
in some way from its nineteenth century counterpart. But how?
It is our hypothesis here that the fall of markets is best under-
stood when we view them as social information systems. Tlheir "demise"
'John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Houghton Mifflin, [hoston,
1967.
2Adolph A. Berle, Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, Harcourt Brace & World, New York, 1968.
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is contingent on the rise of a consciously designed "information
infrastructure" composed of societal information systems that sug-
gest and permit new and anti-market modes of societal coordination
and resource allocation.
Markets as information systems are of course the time honored
explanation for their persistence in industrial society. The number
of decisions required for resource allocation were deemed too numerous
for society's limited information processing capabilities.3 Allocation
was achieved through the profit incentive as resources moved to their
point of highest return. Exchange relationships could substitute
for the transmission of information, since each actor needed only a
limited amount of information for his own maximizing activities.
Through the profit incentive, the invisible hand insured that these
0
'See Chapter One, "The Market as an Information System".
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pieces of fragmented information would be integrated into a rational
whole. No comprehensive knowledge was required for comprehensive
coordination.
The theorists went further. Not only did they insist on the
coordinating capability of markets, but they sought to prove that
such coordination was in fact "optimal". Elaborating on an essentially
moral problem in the Wealth of Nations, these theorists sought to prove
the consistency of private selfishness with social selflessness. The
profit motive meant not only complete coordination, but the "best
allocation of human and material resources.
profit motive meant not only complete coordination, but the "best"
llocation f uman nd aterial esources.
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Now there can be no denying that markets can, in fact, coordinate
economic activities. Two centuries of industrial growth testify to
their power and resilience. But no theoretical or empirical evidence
has proven that such coordination is "optimal". Whatever the general-
ity we wish to accord to "static" models of optimal allocation (and
they are by the admission of their authors sorely deficient), they
clearly "miss the point". Industrial society is a society of change,
of the elaboration of science, technology and social form, of chang-
ing "initial conditions". There can be no proof that market allocation
over time is optimal since information about the future is always
uncertain. Whatever the merits of decentralized decision making in
a static context, decentralized investment decisions possess hidden
and nasty complementarities. The invisible hand is blind to "external-
ities" between the past and the future.
However, if we take a different more historical perspective,
the intution of the theorists seems essentially correct. In an
historical perspective, markets, irrespective of their optimality
properties, proved to be indispensible social instruments for alloc-
ation over time for the coordination of social change. The mobility
of resources, an essential precondition for all industrial growth, means
in the end the mobility of men, and the dissolution of social structure.
By installing the "pecuniary" motive, markets weakened non-economic
and semi-feudal formations that depended on a static configuration of
technology and resources. They insured the minimal adaptability
required for the successful diffusion of innovations.
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However, the pecuniary motive could not suffice alone. Con-
trary to the simplistic litanies of traditional economic liberalism,
exchange relationships are not always beneficial to both parties.
When placed in a context of economic change, they involve the destruc-
tion of old organizational and social capital.4 Adaptability meant
subjecting oneself to the continuous upheaval and "revolutionary"
impact of the capitalist dynamic, with its consequent destructive
effects on the old social and economic structures. It is here that
fragmented information, the consequence of limited information pro-
cessing capabilities, played a crucial role. To the extent that
markets were grounded in limited awareness, their mandates had the
quality of "historical force". The invisible hand stood above human
action and political will. To resist market forces was to resist
the progressive force of history itself. Thus fragmented information
provided an "ideology" of markets that insured its continued viability
despite its destructive impact. More important, where a comprehensive
awareness was absent, where the allocation of resources appeared as
part of a grander more metaphysical scheme inaccessible in its details
to human comprehension, resistance would prove all that more difficult.
Nor, from a historical perspective, would resistance have proven beneficial.
The industrial revolution in all its destructiveness was a necessary
condition for the development of human freedom. Markets based on a
fragmented awareness could carry through with this destructive process.
4See Chapter Four, Information Capital from the Perspective of Conflict.
i
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Thus, irrespective of proofs of "optimality". markets were essential
instruments for allocation "over time". But it is essential to see
that the very justification for markets, limited information processing
capabilities, was at the same time the necessary condition for their
continued viability as instruments for social and economic change.
To be sure, no society has in fact been characterized by such
a high degree of "information fragmentation" so as to be dominated
in total by market "forces". The strictly "political" sphere was
autonomous enough to "regulate" the market, and much of the political
conflict of the nineteenth century was an exercise in limiting the
more destructive aspects of market allocation.5  It was in fact the
long-term program of Marx's Critique of Political Economy to expose
the social relationships behind the seemingly autonomous exchange
patterns, so that market forces would be not only resisted, but ulti-
mately transcended, and the means of production taken up and guided
consciously. But we suggest here that the growth in society's infor-
mation infrastructure, in the form of electronic media, government
and corporate information systems, and the entire university complex,
constitutes a "quantum jump" if not the culmination of the attack and
destruction of "market forces". The growth in the information infra-
structure means that comprehensive information and awareness become
technologically feasible. As a consequence, both the ideology of mar-
kets and the grounds for their continued viability are shattered.
5 For a full elaboration of this theme see, Karl Polanyi, The Great
Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957. The writer's debt to
Polanyi should be evident throughout this essay.
__
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We can understand the impact of the electronic media and the
information technologiesm by analyzing three inter-related develop-
ments. The growth in the information infrastructure "socializes"
the means of production, encapsulates the future into the present,
and leads to demands for democratic access to decision-making pro-
cesses.
Marx pointed out long ago that the means of production in
industrial society become increasingly social, that the distinction
between the private and social becomes increasingly blurred. Economists
would have to agree, since in anticipating the integration of markets,
they have expressed the same idea. As mobility increases, as factor
and product substitutability increases, the ramifications of private
decisions spread further and faster throughout the economy. The
private decision has increasingly social consequences. Information
systems complete this process by providing comprehensive information
that exposes these interdependencies. Different transportation tech-
nologies can be evaluated for their impact on racial residential pat-
terns, while the reading capabilities of lower class children can be
studied as a function of the impact of food processing on nutrition.
Where the means of production were in fact social, they are now ex-
perienced as social. More important, the information technologies
will reveal not only given interdependencies but create new ones.
"The medium is the message", or in the economist's parlance, information
technologies create "consumption externalities". Geographically diverse
-- -
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groups, once compartmentalized, now interact "through" the societal
information systems. The television in the Indian village means
that western consumption patterns are visible to the peasant, and it
thus transforms the aspiration level and mobility patterns of the
urbanizing Asian masses. Thus by revealing given interdependencies
and creating new ones the distinction between public and private is
eliminated.
To be sure the concept of "inter-relatedness" is not a new one.
John Donne knew that "no man is an island". What is new today is that
this idea is not arrived at through the exercise of an apocalyptic or
poetic imagination, but rather grows out of daily experience. Whether
it be through the media, education, or government information systems,
interdependencies are revealed in their full empirical complexity,
to an increasingly broad sector of the population. Interdependence
becomes a working proposition based on the "facts and figures".
It is this full empirical awareness that makes the future appear
increasingly malleable. Just as the private becomes the public, so
is the future collapsed into the present. Where interdependencies
are understood the future consequences of present decisions can be
grasped. The ecological consequences of forms of energy utilization
can be studied and anticipated. Comprehensive information can expose
the complementarity of investments decision that were hidden by market
forms of coordination. In effect, "optimal" allocation between present
and future seems increasingly possible. The growth in the "futuristic"
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sensibility develops concomitantly with the technological capability
for planning the future. The rational allocation of investments is
no longer a "Utopian" prospect. The information technologies promise
to provide truly optimal coordination precisely in the area where
markets can only fail.
In effect, society in its present and future forms is experienced
socially, and private decision-making prerogatives based on private
property, or governmental secrecy appear increasingly unviable and
illegitimate. The investment decision of a single entrepreneur is
no longer his prerogative since it has perceivable social consequences.
As a consequence, there develops in society a demand for democratic
decision making based on full access to comprehensive information. As
society is experienced socially, there develops a demand to understand
it in its full social dimension. A comprehensive understanding, an
ability to structure and pattern the increasing flow of information,
becomes a necessary prerequisite for democratic decision making. Here
then is the key to the new dimensions of social conflict in the age of
information and communication. The industrial class antagonisms were
based on the distribution of income within the interplay of market
forces, but "post-industrial" conflict is based on the distribution
of information, on access to comprehensive understanding, within a
framework of societal planning,of a consciously elaborated human
future.
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However, it is important to see that the growth in this planning
framework itself is not and has not been a result of consciously-willed
political decisions. Rather, it resembles more an "unconscious"
social revolution whose tempo has increased since World War Two.
Throughout the "capitalist" world, governmental decision-making has
increasingly guided economic growth and change.
6 Even in America, the
last bastion of "free enterprise", the growth of the public sector,
the rise of Keynesian policy, and governmental funding of much research
and expenditure have increasingly politicized economic change, and
delimited the private market. The growth in the new information and
communication technologies gives this process an even greater momentum.
As the technological capabilities for societal planning and coordination
increase, capitalism must willy nilly unravel itself. The agents of
this "revolution" need not be and most likely will not be conscious
political agents but rather the force of the new technologies itself.
Within the tumul of undirected and even less understood political con-
flict, these technological capabilities will be taken up and new modes
of coordination will develop.
But such a process need not appear in a "liberating" context. It
need not advance man's freedom. As the Russian experience all to well
demonstrates, planned allocation of material and human resources can
mean in the end the totalitarian command of such resources.
It is here that the conflict is joined. The conflicts over the
new technologies of communication, learning and inlformat ion be(comue
6 For a complete discussion of this development, see Andrew Slhoniiceld,
Modern Capitalism, Oxford University Press, London, 1965.
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conflicts over their mode of development within the overriding frame-
work of a consciously designed human future. The demand for demo-
cratic decision-making and the utilization of the new technologies
for such purposes stand against the powerful totalitarian thrust
implicit in conscious control and design.
The demise of the market means not the disappearance of all
markets but rather the end of the market as the arbiter of social
change. Markets no longer are the key to man's "social reproduction"
and the industrial class antagonisms lose their force and power.
Instead the new, vibrant and resonant conflicts develop within the
technologies of information communication and learning; the technologies
that form and structure the societal planning processes and that pro-
vide the information models and human labor required for conscious
decision making. It is the relationship to these new "means of pro-
duction and reproduction" that will determine the levels and quality
of social conflict in the "post-industrial" age. Any program for
radical research and action thus must transcend the old "industrial-
class" framework of thought. Instead it must focus on the new tech-
nologies, and try to understand their transformative impact on com-
munication, decision making, and learning. Only in this way can they
be appropriated for human freedom.
__
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§2. The End of Economics
Economics as a social science developed as a response to the
new complexities of the industrial revolution. By analyzing market
patterns and exchange relationships it hoped to provide insights into
the elaborating forms of industrial technology and life. The demise
of the market as the instrument for social change raises serious
questions as to the relevance and centrality of economics as a science
of society.
We can understand this problem better by distinguishing between
three kinds of economic study and analyze, in turn, the impact of the
"communications revolution" on each one. Economics can be divided into
a social science of market forces, a policy science to guide govern-
mental action (i.e., Keynesian economics) and an engineering science
for the technocratic allocation of resources.
It is as a social science of market forces that economics is
most seriously compromised. Its historic centrality as a social
science rested on the centrality of markets as the tool for industrial
and social development. When all social development and social con-
flict arose from the interplay of market forces, economics was the key
for both contemplating and changing history. When market forces are
increasingly delimited, and social change politicized within the new
framework of communication information and learing, the study of
economics as a key to history loses its centrality.
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All this might appear particularly unjust if the analysis of
"exchange relationships" were still a rich and fertile field of study.
But it is probably safe to say that in the last half century no new
and essential insights have been developed in this area. Despite the
hope and program of the mathematical and neo-classical school, our
concept of the invisible hand has not significantly changed. Instead
general equilibrium theory has served to remind us of the remarkable
set of mathematical restrictions required if market allocation is to
prove "optimal". The general equilibrium theorists hoped that by de-
veloping and analyzing these restrictions, they could understand the
real world workings of decentralized allocation but they have obtained
few such insights. In fact, general equilibrium theory appears to be
at a theoretical dead end, and one of its major theorists has wondered
if the entire program was not misconceived.7 One can surmise that if
it had not been for the interest in the mathematics of maximization
under constraints, the vacuum in neo-classical thought would have long
been apparent. 8
In retrospect, neo-classical economics will probably be judged
as one of the more curious intellectual abberations of the twentieth
century. Based on a nineteenth century mind set of utility maximization
7Frank Hahn, "Some Adjustment Problems", Econometrica, Jan., 1970, 1-17.
8The talmudic branch of economic theory known as the pure theory of
international trade is the best example of the momentum provided by
mathematics, independent of any contact with market realities. Based
on a theorem enunciated by Ricardo almost two centuries ago, it rests
on the myriad of permutations of the two-factor, two-commodity, two-
country model. When confronted with the unfortunate "Leontief Paradox"
international trade theorists were forced to redefine the concept of
factor so as to make the entire theory tautological.
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animal spirited entrepreneurs, and pure competition.-- and set in
a framework of mild mathematical interest -- it obscured the essential
exhaustion of the analysis of exchange relationships.
Economics as a policy science, or Keynesian economics, has always
rested on a strange amalgam of market and non-market orientations.
As a science of governmental policy, it presupposed the ascendancy of
a political governmental structure that stood above market forces.
However, the specific application of monetary and fiscal policy was
thought to take place through the market and thus stood outside politics.
The economist was the "invisible dial turner" who affected only the
level but not the structure of economic activity. Monetary and fiscal
policy was thus politically neutral, and the economist was the invisible
assistant of the invisible hand. In this way economists could come to
grips with the rising non-market forces while at the same time insist-
ing on the significance of their own skills as theoreticians of markets.
Nor was this seemingly paradoxical resolution without foundation,
since in fact neither market or non-market forces completely con-
trolled the processes of resource allocation (though the vision of
complete neutrality was an exercise in bad faith, since government
spending can never be neutral, nor does monetary policy affect all
sectors of investment spending evenly).9
However, the technological developments described in the last
section -- the socialization of the means of production through
90ne suspects,for instance, that the economist's opposition to wage
and price controls flows not so much from his sense of their in-
feasibility but rather because they violate the sense of his own
skills. Wage and price controls would entail the full acceptance of
non-market control of economic development.
weakness is exposed. Not only is a broad interdisciplinary framework
required if future social structures are to be anticipated -- a frame-
work that has thus far eluded not only the economist, but all social
scientists -- but the economist must confront the hopeless abstractions
of his own neo-classical heritage (even in its "engineering" component
of shadow prices, linear programming, etc.)lo Moreover, the economist
must confront the fact that no matter how many cost-benefit resource
allocation studies he does, and whatever their merit, there exists as
yet no force to take up and give political muscle and flesh-and-blood
reality to his own recommendations and speculations. Just as a sensibility
1 0 To quote the mathematical economist N. Georgescu-Roegen, "But no
other profession has committed the sin of theorizing in a vacuum as
often and with as complete an ingenuousness as the economist of the
Classical and especially, the Neo-classical tradition". See Nicolas
Georgescu-Roegen, "The Institutional Aspects of Peasant Communities:
An Analytical View" in Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development,
ed., Clifton R. Wharton Jr., Aldine, Chicago, 1969. Leontief has
hoped that this abstractionist tendency could be overcome with massive
infusions of real live data. See, Wassily Leontief, "Theoretical
Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts", American Economic Review, March
1971, 1-7.
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information, the developing future orientation -- destroy this un-
easy resolution. Increasingly, the economic question becomes one
of the structure and not of the level of spending, of the allocation
of investments, of the pattern of social reproduction. Market
forces appear insufficient and there develops a demand to take
"technology in hand" and consciously guide the elaboration of the
future.
Thus the economist is thrown willy nilly into a species of
"social engineering", into a study of alternative investment patterns
and their impact on future social structure, and it is here that his
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always precedes the actual political development, so when the
economist responds to the new sensibility -- to the future orien-
tation - - he must confront the actual political vacuum, the absence
of any force that can in fact carry out the process of rational
resource allocation. Instead he must confront a government that
sinks its investments into the military expenditure and expresses
its power with air wars against semi-developed countries. All cost-
benefit studies, all programs of efficient allocation can only appear
weak and undirected when compared against a backgrop of eighty
billion dollars of waste.
In effect, the vacuum that the economist faces in his own work,
the exhaustion of neo-classical economics and the Keynesian pose,
but the absence of any methodology and social structure to give a
new discipline of social engineering real meaning, corresponds pre-
cisely to the present historical vacuum; the destruction of the ideology
and efficacy of markets by the new information technologies, but the
absence of any real political force to take up the new technologies
in the interests of conscious and rational resource allocation. It
is of course this gap that is responsible for the seemingly sudden
dissolution of social structures and the appearance of all manners of
"crises". A society as complex and uncoordinated as America cannot
impose on itself new modes of coordination without deep political
convulsions. The economist is, of course, part of this convulsion.
The historical transition into "post-industr ialism" destroys
his own intellectual perspectives. H~e must confront fully
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the end of economics if he is to avoid a creeping cynicism and
skepticism as to the value of his own intellect. Only in this way
can he develop new and future oriented skills that demonstrate full
cognizance of his own changing social position.
Is there a Radical Economics?
One of the responses to the vacuum in economic thought has been
the attempted development of a "radical economics", conceived of as
both a political and methodological critique of conventional theory.
Its political roots are abundantly clear, but its methodological
substance is not. The radical economist shares in the general re-
vulsion against the destructive use of American power and stands for
its more humane and rational application. But he has not defined
his methodological background. Many have gone back to the old Marxist
texts in an attempt to find a structure that would satisfy their
political sensibilities; but they face a closed chapter in intellec-
tual history. Both the detractors and supporters of the labor theory
of value have long ago filled out all areas of debate, and both long
ago forgot that Marx was not an economist, and was not interested in
contributing one more refined theory of price fluctuation. He sought
instead a critique of political economy that would expose the social
relationships that lay behind exchange relationships. In this way
he hoped to bring a vibrant and developing industrial working class
to a new consciousness, so that the means of production could be
taken up and brought to their full potential.
...
0
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In the absence of such a working class, the new radical economists
are thrown into a kind of "sentimental" Marxism. They become ob-
sessed with the "distribution of income", which while of social signi-
ficance, can hardly provide the basis for a new analytic, a frame-
work that will produce new insights and discoveries. They condemn
themselves to rediscovering the same fact over and over, that in fact
the rich are richer than the poor, and that power is distributed
unequally.
Thus the conventional economists have probably been right.
Radical economics has contributed more of a sensibility rather than a
structure, though the conventional types have been all to unwilling to
respond to that sensibility, to face the vacuum in their own work."l
In the end, the radical economist must face a central contra-
diction that lies at the root of his effort. He must realize that
both political economy and the critique of political economy stand
and fall together. In the nineteenth century, when industrialization
became the central project of the West and markets the instruments
for change, both political economy and its critique represented legi-
timate perspectives on historical change. They were the poles or
antimonies through which the process could be contemplated and trans-
formed. The demise of the market and the gradual disappearance of
industrial class conflict means both the end of economics and its
antimony.
I11n their more cynical moments, the conventional will reply to a
critique by a radical with "Das kennt jeder Esel", or "lvery ass
knows that", attributed apparently to Brahms. In otlher words, "we
knew all along how silly we were being, so who says you're so smart
anyway", which hardly answers the criticism.
I --
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The radical economist thus needs a new source of inspiration,
and curiously enough, we can find it in Marx, but we must go beyond
and deeper than the labor theory of value and the distribution of
income. To Marx the central and motive contradition of capitalism
lay not in wage labor, surplus value, or the distribution of income
but rather in the tension between the productive and technological
potential, and capitalism's inability to appropriate or realize this
potential. The distribution of income, wage exploitation, and re-
current economic crises were significant only to the extent that
they were indicators and signs of this fundamental tension. They
were such indicators precisely because the problem of social repro-
duction, of the elaboration of technology was played out in the market.
The demise of the market means that these indicators lose their
social significance as signs of "revolutionary" tensions.
As we have already indicated the problem of social reproduction,
of social change, is increasingly played out within the context of
societal planning and within the framework of the new communication
and information technologies. In fact, as the means of production
are socialized through information, so does the technological potential
become increasingly apparent to those who have access to the means of
information and communication. Society learns of its technological
potential in its full empirical complexity, it comprehends the gap
between what is and what might be, as its own information technologies
proliferate.
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Thus, if radical social science is to explore the new dynamics
of this old and fundamental tension, it must study the new tech-
nologies of communication information and learning. It must go
beyond the simplistic "new working class" theories and explore the
way in which these technologies are transforming the work, the skill
structures and the sensibilities of those who have access to the new
means of communication and information. It must analyze the dynamics
of planned social change within the framework of these means of pro-
duction and reproduction. It must understand the convulsive political
process whereby the planned allocation of resource finally dominates
the processes of economic and social change. It must confront both
the totalitarian and anti-totalitarian potential implicit in this
process.
The conventional economist is right when he points out that
there is no "other" economics. But unfortunately, he does not go far
enough; there is in fact no economics. There is a whole new area of
study opened up by the new technologies that lies outside the tradi-
tional academic categories. If the radical economist commits his
intellectual energies to this new field of study, he will help ful-
fill Marx's central program, appropriating the means of production
for human freedom.
~
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APPENDIX
THE BRIEFEST INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION THEORY
The information measure is essentially a measure of dispersion.
Intuitively, we can see that the greater the variance of the pro-
bability distribution of some variable, the more "uncertain" we are
about it, and thus the greater the amount of information contained
in any message that tells us of its exact location. Thus, where the
variable is distributed with variance zero, there is no information
in the message specifying its location. If we consider a six sided
die, each face marked with a "snake-eyes", and if we let the variable
be "the side that comes up with the toss of the die", then there will
be no information in the message that specifies which face came up,
since we know that snake eyes must appear.
Now consider a normal die with six different faces. How much
information is contained in the message that specified which face came
up? We might say that the message contains "six units" since it
selects one out of six equi-probable possibilities. (Note that where
the faces are not equally likely to come up, we could not in good
conscience answer "six units" since the variance of the variable "which
die will come up" will be less than when they were all equi-probable).
Continuing in this way, we could say that the toss of two dice con-
tained 6 X 6 or 36 units of information.
Now in the interests of "additivity" it will be more convenient
to measure our information units in logs. Thus, the information
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contained in the toss of a single die will be 4o(6), and in the toss
of two dice 4(36). Note then, that the information contained in
the toss of two dice is simply twice the information contained in
the toss of one die, since
4 (3 6) =Q4o( 6X 6) ==2o (6) +4~(6)
This is the sense in which information functions are additive.
Now it is often the convention to measure these logs to
the base two. In this case the basic unit of measurement becomes
the message that specifies the location of a variable in a set of
two equi-probable states, since,
4O2(2) = 1
This unit of measure is called a "bit" of information. The number
of bits contained in the two of two normal dice will thus be&~ 2 (36).
Now, how can we measu: e information when the "events" are not
equi-probable. Imagine the following situation. Let our die have
four faces marked with a snake eyes and two faces marked with a "six".
There are thus two possibilities with probabilities 3 and - respectively.
Now the amount of information contained in the die will clearly be less
than942(6), but how much less?
One way of looking at this is to see that the toss of the die
adds to the a priori information we have about the die. How much a
priori information do we have? Well, intuitively we could say that
since snake eyes occurs with a probability of - and six with a pro-
bability of -, we have the following amount of a priori information,
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In other words, we have a set of four faces each occurring with
equal probability and a set of two faces each occurring with equal
probability. Taking a weighted average gives a measure of our a
priori information. Thus the information gained in the message
telling us which face came up is
26 - s44 - ' 3
or more generally
bo N- (N 1/N) 2 N1 - (N2/N) bg N2
NI+ N2 = N
which can be written as
(N1 + N2 ) g. N - N1 I N1 - N2 fg N2
N
which reduces to
- (N1 /N) 4og N1 /N - (N2/N) Io NJ/N
or alternatively
-Pi bQ Pi - Pj 2bc Pj
where
Pi = N1/N and Pj = NJ/N
So if we consider a probability distribution with states, i.j,...
and probabilities Pi, Pj,... then the information value of this distri-
bution, or alternatively its "uncertainty" value will be given as
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H = - ~ Pi 2ord Pi
Note that H must always be positive since 2a~. Pi is of necessity
negative.
The formula for the uncertainty of a distribution is suggestive
of the following interpretation. The information value of a given
state is proportional to the negative of the log value of its pro-
bability. Thus, the higher its probability, the lower its infor-
mation value. (In other words, the more likely it is to occur, the
less information we have when we are told that in fact it has oc-
curred). The total information value of the entire distribution is
then given by a weighted average of the states in the distribution.
Note that in the case where all the states are equi-probable,
we would have
- iIlgP = -N(1/N) oa, (1/N) =-2og(1/N) Q o~ N
which is consistent with our original definition. In other words,
a distribution of N states will be at a "maximum" when all the states
are equi-probable. Note that when we write the information value of
a function, it is usually abbreviated as
H~p,. ,~)where H is its information or uncertainty
value.
The additivity of information functions means that we can "break
down" the probability of its distribution into its constitutent parts.
Thus, if we consider the following probability distribution of four
states,
A.25
B
.25
C
.25
D
.25
then
H(.25, .25, .25, .25)=H(.5, .5) +.5H(.5, .5)+ .5H(.5, .5)
or
H(A,B,C,D) = H(A+B, C+D) + .5H(A,B) + .5(C,D)
This decomposition can be viewed as a tree structure
(1)
Ci-D
so that the total information value of the function is the weighted
average of the information values at each node.
The formula for this specific case is easily confirmed
H(.25, .25, .25, .25) = -4(.25) Qo .25 = -(-2) = 2 bits
and
H(.5, .5) = -2(.5) bg .5 = -(-1) = 1
so that
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so that
H(.5, .5) + .5H(.5, .5) + .5H(.5, .5) = 2 bits
All the other formulations required for reading the text are
explained in the body of the text itself.
1
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